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THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF NEARLY DOUBLING
THE MINIMUM WAGE – THE CASE OF HUNGARY
BY
GÁBOR KERTESI – JÁNOS KÖLLŐ
Abstract
The effect of minimum wages on employment has been a matter of de-
bate for more than a decade. Apart from a few cases (Puerto Rico, In-
donesia, Columbia) the empirical works analysed the aftermaths of mi-
nor increases in the minimum wage, and yielded mixed results. Hun-
gary 2000-2002 provides a unique opportunity to look at the effects of
an exceptionally large minimum wage hike in a relatively developed
market economy. Unexpectedly, the country’s right-wing government
increased the statutory minimum by 96 per cent (XX per cent in real
terms) in only two steps between December 2000 and January 2002.
The paper looks at the short-run effects of the first hike (57 per cent). It
finds that increasing the minimum wage significantly reduced employ-
ment in the small firm sector and adversely influenced the jobloss and
job finding probabilities of low-wage workers. The effects appear to be
stronger in low-wage segments of the market, and depressed regions,
where the minimum wage bites deeper into the wage distribution.
Keywords: Minimum Wage, Transition
JEL Classification: J3, P35
KERTESI GÁBOR – KÖLLŐ JÁNOS
A MINIMÁLBÉR DUPLÁJÁRA EMELÉSÉNEK FOGLALKOZTATÁSI
KÖVETKEZMÉNYEI – A MAGYARORSZÁGI ESET ÉRTÉKELÉSE
Összefoglaló
A minimálbér-emelések kedvezőtlen foglalkoztatási következményeivel
kapcsolatos szokásos előrejelzések érvényességét az elmúlt évtizedben
számos kutató megkérdőjelezte. A legújabb empirikus mérési eredmények
is meglehetősen ellentmondásosak. Néhány harmadik világbeli ország
(mint Puerto Rico és Indonézia) példájától eltekintve, ahol nagymérvű
minimálbér-emelésekre került sor, és a foglalkoztatás-csökkenéssel
kapcsolatos hagyományos előrejelzések is igazolódtak, igen vegyes
eredményeket találunk. Kisebb mértékű minimálbér-emelések jó részénél
nem sikerült a foglalkoztatás csökkenését kimutatni. A 2001. és a 2002.
évi magyarországi minimálbér-emelések, amelyek a bázisévhez képest
egy év alatt nagyjából a duplájára növelték a minimálbér szintjét, kivé-
teles lehetőséget biztosítanak arra, hogy egy nagymérvű foglalkoz-
tatáspolitikai beavatkozás következményeit tanulmányozhassuk. A tanul-
mány a minimálbér-emelés 2001. januári, első hullámának (57 %-os
emelés) rövid távú foglalkoztatási következményeit vizsgálja, a leginkább
érintett népesség, a kisvállalati szektor alacsony bérű foglalkoztatottjaira
összpontosítva. A tanulmány legfontosabb következtetései szerint a
minimálbér-emelés lényeges mértékben növelte a munkaerőköltségeket,
és csökkentette a foglalkoztatás szintjét a kisvállalati szektorban, továbbá
előnytelenül befolyásolta az alacsony bérű dolgozók állásban maradási
esélyeit, illetve rontotta a korábban alacsony bérű álláskeresők állásba
kerülési esélyeit. Ezek a kedvezőtlen következmények annál súlyosabbak,
minél nagyobb volt az alacsony bérű foglakoztatottak aránya, illetve mi-
nél rosszabb volt az eredeti foglalkoztatási helyzet egy régióban.6
1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2001 the Hungarian government increased the statutory mini-
mum wage from Ft 25,500 to Ft 40,000. One year later the minimum was
set at Ft 50,000. The two hikes increased the minimum wage-average wage
ratio from values around 28-29 per cent in 1994-2000 to 39 per cent in
2001 and 43 per cent in 2002. A minimum wage increase of this magnitude
is unprecedented in contemporary OECD practices albeit similarly radical
adjustments did occur in developing countries including Indonesia (Rama,
2000; Alatas and Cameron, 2003) and Puerto Rico (Freeman and Castillo-
Freeman, 1991). The shock hitting the Hungarian labour market was am-
plified by the fact that the minimum wage regulations cover all employ-
ment contracts without exemptions for young workers, small firms, back-
ward regions, or low-wage industries – a common practice in EU member
states as discussed in Dolado et al. (1996) and elsewhere.
In this paper we study the impact on employment of the first hike. Identi-
fying minimum wage effects when the economy is hit by other exogeneous
shocks that may affect low-wage and high-wage workers in different ways,
like the recession and the parliamentary elections of 2002 in Hungary,
seems to us too difficult in a non-experimental setting. At this stage of the
research we restrict the attention to the short-run aftermaths of increasing
the minimum wage from Ft 25,500 to Ft 40,000 – a change which came
unexpectedly in an otherwise peaceful period of steady economic growth.
Minimum wages in Hungary are less concentrated on teenagers, school
leavers, and low-wage industries than in the U.S. or Western Europe. The
key dimensions instead are firm size and tenure. About 2/3 of the minimum
wage workers are employed in firms with less than 50 employees, and 2/3
of them spent no more than 5 years with the firm. (Only 1/8 is employed by
larger firms and have tenures exceeding 5 years.)
1 These peculiarities sug-
gest that in order to trace minimum wage effects one has to pay particular
attention to the small firm sector on the one hand, and the entry and exit
portals of internal labour markets on the other. Accordingly, we shall study
the evolution of employment in small firms (Section 4b); flows out of em-
ployment (Section 4c); and exit to jobs from unemployment (Section 4d).
This will be preceeded by an attempt to assess the magnitude of the shock
(Section 2); confronting the declared aims of the minimum wage hike with
theoretical expectations elaborated in the recent literature (Section 3); and
                                               
1 These data are drawn from the 2001. 2
nd quarter wave of the Labour Force Survey
(LFS) and will be discussed in more detail later.7
an overview of descriptive statistics on employment (Section 4a). Section 5
concludes.
Since the analytical parts work with three data sets of different character
the methodological issues will be discussed within the relevant sections 4b-
4d. The data used there and elsewhere come from a variety of sources in-
troduced in a Data Appendix. The paper is basically concerned with the
employment effects but contains a Supplement discussing spillover wage
effects.
The almost general agreement on the risks of minimum wage legislation
gradually dissolved in the last two decades (Brown, 1999). The widely ac-
cepted ’stylized fact’ that high minimum wages kill jobs was called into
question by contradicting empirical findings in the 1990s. This case study
has not much to add to the ongoing theoretical and methodological dispute
but may be of interest to researchers seeking in vivo tests of the theoretical
predictions. The question of whether nearly doubling the minimum wage
had or had no effect on employment in Hungary is, first of all, important
for the local community and as such is admittedly non-academic. We think,
however, that in the current state of the international debate it bears rele-
vance for a wider public.
2. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE SHOCK
In 1989, when Hungary’s last communist government introduced a statu-
tory minimum wage it amounted to 34.6 % of the average wage, a level
well below the EU average but slightly higher than that of Spain, the lag-
gard within the EU. (Figure 1). The minimum related to gross monthly
earnings net of overtime and shift pay, bonuses, rewards, and premia; was
legally binding; and covered all employers and full-time employees. The
fundamentals did not change since then. In 1990-1998 adjustments were
negotiated annually by a national-level tripartite council and entered into
effect in the annual budgets. Under the right-wing cabinet of 1998-2002 the
minimum wage was set unilaterally by the government.
During a decade of transition the relative value of the minimum wage was
almost constantly falling: in 2000 it amounted to only 29.1% of the average
wage.
2 The two consecutive hikes brought the ratio back to the OECD
                                               
2 On similar developments in other Central and East European countries see Standing
and Vaughan-Whitehead (1995).8
range though with 38.6% in 2001 and 43.7% in 2002 it still lagged behind
the average.
The minimum wage-average wage ratio, also known as the Kaitz index (if
weighted with coverage as in Kaitz, 1970) tells only one aspect of how the
minimum wage relates to the ’market wage’. An equally telling indicator is
the fraction of workers paid at or near the minimum. Figure 2 reveals three
remarkable features of how this ratio developed over time. The ratio was
explicitly low in international comparison until at least 1997: less than 1%
in 1989 and 3% in 1997. While the average wage/minimum wage ratio was
falling in 1991–2000 the fraction of workers paid near the minimum was
rising clearly suggesting that, with the build-up of a sizeable low-wage
population, even a falling minimum wage could become effective.
3 Most
importantly, the data depict the fundamental change which came in 2001–
2002 when the two hikes increased the fraction of employees paid near the
minimum from 5% to 12.1% and 17.3%, respectively. While in 2000 Hun-
gary was located in the lower part of the OECD range (countries having
similar ratios in the early 1990s were Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and the US) in only two years it shifted to the position of a heavy
outlier with an exceptionally high fraction of minimum-wage workers.
The price shock caused by the radical reform is difficult to assess since
there are at least four factors at work. The immediate effect depends on the
fraction of workers whose earnings should rise, the gap between their
wages and the new minimum, compliance with the law, and the rigidity of
relative wages which may induce further instantaneous (and unintended)
adjustment in the lower tail of the wage distribution. A lower-bound esti-
mate of the immediate wage shock can be defined as:
                                               
3 The growth of low-wage employment can be easily demonstrated with several indica-
tors: between 1989 and 2000 the d1/d9 ratio of gross earnings fell from 0.32 to 0.2;
the d1/median ratio decreased from 0.59 to 0.48; the fraction of workers paid less
than 2/3 of the median grew from 16% to 26%, their average earnings fell from 48%
to 38% of the national average. The fact that even in 2000 only 20 in 100 workers
earning less than 2/3 of the median were paid at or near the statutory minimum wage
clearly suggested the dominance of market forces in this process.The data referred
are based on the Wage Survey (WS). Alternatively the paradox could be explained
by aggravating imperfections and/or a general move from competition to monopsony
or analogous market structures. In a competitive labour market workers with mar-
ginal product below the minimum wage are simply not employed so there should be
no spike in the wage distribution at or near the minimum.9
where F is the fraction of workers with sub-minimum wages, wF is their
average wage at the moment of the hike, wH is the average wage of other
workers, and w* is the new minimum wage. The formula measures the size
of the wage shock at the moment of the minimum wage hike if all sub-
minimum wages are raised to the level of the new minimum and there is no
further instantanous wage and employment adjustment. We prefer ω  to the
customarly used F as the latter ignores valuable information on the pre-hike
earnings level of low-wage workers while, in fact, both measures rely on
the same assumptions.
We estimated ω  for several groups of labour using the large individual data
set of the Wage Survey (WS, conducted in May each year) which covers
firms employing more than 5 workers and the public sector. Table 1 pres-
ents the mean ω -s for the interactions of 5 age groups, 3 educational levels,
and 4 groups of regions.
4
Under the assumptions discussed earlier we can estimate that the minimum
wage hike of 2001 caused a shock of 2.33 per cent to average monthly base
wages. (The second wave implied a hypothetical average wage growth of
1.78 per cent.) The ω -s varied in a wide range depending on skill, age, and
region: the estimates are 1 per cent for secondary and higher qualification
and 6 for primary or lower education; 1 for workers older than 45 and 6.1 for
those under 25; 1.7 for the ’best’ ¼ of regions and 3.6 for the least fortunate
quartile. The average wages of workers under 35 with primary or vocational
education who lived in depressed regions (3
rd and 4
th quartiles) were ex-
pected to rise by as much as 9.7–16.7 per cent at the moment of the hike.
Compliance with the law
Checking whether the increased minima were actually paid to workers is
essential in a country where non-compliance with the state regulations has
been traditionally strong. Firms openly setting a sub-minimum base wage
for their full-time employees face a high risk of detection and punishment.
                                               
4 Since our wage observations related to May we spoke of sub-minimum wages if  a
worker’s wage was lower than w*/(1+r) where r was the rate of wage inflation be-
tween May and the time of the minimum wage increase.On the basis of the monthly
wage data available at the Central Statistical Office we set r at 0.32 per cent per
month between May and November 2000. The data on monthly earnings in Decem-
ber are severely affected by year-end premia and bonuses on the one hand, and year-
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Accordingly, open non-compliance was infrequent as shown in Table 2 .
The proportion of full-time workers paid below the new minimum wage in
May 2001 was 1.9 per cent as reported by firms in the WS. 1.4 per cent of
the full-time workers interviewed in the UI Exit to Jobs Survey (EJS), and
3.6 in the Labour Force Survey (LFS), reported gross monthly earnings
below Ft 40,000 in April-June, respectively.
5 These percentages are upper-
bound estimates since unpaid leave and other disturbances can temporarily
result in sub-minimum monthly earnings.
There are hidden ways of rescuing the regulations, however. Some firms
may employ their workers full-time but register them as part-time and pay
them subminimum monthly wages. The fact that the fraction earning sub-
minimum wages within all wage earners including part-timers was only 5.5
per cent (LFS) and 2.6 per cent (EJS) in April-June 2001 suggests that
these practices were of marginal importance (Table 2).
Second, firms may fraudulently lay off their workers and contract with
them as ’trade partners’. The magnitude of this kind of manipulation cannot
be assessed in general but the EJS provides information on a subsample of
low-wage workers. As shown in Table 3, only 1.5 per cent of the low-wage
UI recipients who found a job in April 2001 expected to earn their labour
income as a contract fee, as opposed to 64.7 per cent receiving a fixed sal-
ary, and 33.8 per cent paid an hourly wage. Only a single person in a sam-
ple of 3,157 newly hired low-wage workers expected to earn a contract fee
lower than Ft 40,000.
Third, and most importantly, firms can increase the base wage and reduce
side payments. The pecuniary offsets, however, unveil in comparisons of
base wages with broader concepts of worker compensation. Most side
payments, especially shift pay and overtime pay, are set as percentages of
the base wage therefore regular monthly earnings are expected to rise at
approximately the same rate as base wages if firms comply with the regu-
lations.
The validity of this assumption can be first checked using the grouped data
introduced in Table  1. The descriptive regressions ∆ ln(compensation)=
b∆ ln(ω )+gX+u presented in Table 4 suggest that 1 per cent difference in
the minimum wage shock was associated with nearly 1 per cent difference
in the change of actual compensation between May 2000 and 2001, which-
                                               
5 The bias from not distinguishing between base wages and earnings is predictably
minimal as these fall close to each other at the lower tiers of the wage distribution.
The average earnings and base wages of workers earning less than Ft 40,000 in May
2001 were Ft 35,025 and Ft 34,736, respectively. (WS)11
ever definition of ’compensation’ was used. A dummy for secondary and
higher education was included in the equations to account for the fact that
the proportion of side payments within earnings fell in this particular cate-
gory of labour implying faster growth of base wages (but not of earnings)
compared to ω .
6
A more precise account of offsets can be given using firm-level or indus-
try-level data. The effect on labour demand of higher minimum wages de-
pends on the shock to real labour costs rather than real wages. The cost ef-
fect can be partly or fully offset by cutting the non-wage components of
employee compensation, improvements in workers’s productivity, or a
wedge between the growth of producer and consumer prices. We use data
from the financial records of 20,601 firms in 2000 and 21,722 firm in 2001
(FR) to show that labour costs were also strongly (nearly equiproportion-
ally) affected by the minimum wage increase even if we account for some
of the above mentioned possibilites.
Given the sampling procedure of the WS we can not reliably measure ω  on
the firm level so the data were aggregated to the 4-digit industry level. The
question addressed is how wage costs (wages + taxes) and total pecuniary
employee compensation costs (wages + taxes + other payments to persons)
measured in real terms were affected by ω  holding productivity growth and
some other factors (potentially affecting wages and compliance with the
law) constant.
In addition to wage costs (earnings including bonuses, and premia) and so-
cial security contributions total compensation comprises ‘other payments to
persons’ containing contract fees, honoraria and miscellanous casual pay-
ments. The three items accounted for 64.0%, 24.4%, and 20.6% of the total
compensation in 2000. Allocating the tax burden proportionately we get
that pre-tax earnings amounted to 84.6 % of the pre-tax total compensation.
An ambiguity in what should be considered ’labour cost’ stems from the
fact that ’other payments’ apparently include components representing
profit-sharing rather than indispensable payments for the services of labour.
                                               
6 2002 was an election year which started with generous pay increase in the public sec-
tor with high-skilled employees acquiring the largest gains. The total earnings of
public sector employees with secondary and higher education grew by 17.7% as op-
posed to 11.5% received by their business sector counterparts and a grand mean of
11%.Furthermore, the recession reaching Hungary in the Fall of 2001 may have had
non-trivial wage effects loosening the linkage between the second minimum wage
shock and actual wage outcomes. Even so, once high skills are controlled for, the hy-
pothesis of the elasticity of the wage with respect to ω  being equal to 1 could not be
rejected.12
Furthermore, ‘other payments’ are often directed at persons who are not
employed by the firm. We believe that wage cost is a better approximation
of  labour cost but shall also consider the effect of ω  on total compensation.
Since productivity is partly driven by employment adjustment that, in turn,
is influenced by the wage we estimate the simultaneous equations system:
where w is wage cost or total compensation cost, ω  is the minimum wage
shock on the industry level, q and n stand for output and employment, FU
denotes unionisation, and X and Z comprise controls.
7 Monetary aggregates
were discounted using the producer price index available on the 4, 3 or 2
digit levels (35 distinct values). The symbols denote log changes  between
2000 and 2001 on a year-on-year basis. Equation (2) relates the change in
labour costs to productivity and the minimum wage shock. Equation (3) is a
conditional labour demand equation based on the assumption that employ-
ment is affected by output (q) and the cost of labour (w) on the short run.
The parameter of interest is β 1 and the expectation is β 1=1 under full com-
pliance and no offsets. In the 3sls estimation employment and wages (and
hence productivity) were treated as endogeneous.
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample and Table 6 con-
tains both sure and 3sls estimates for models with wage costs and total
compensation costs as the measures of w. The parameters of ω  in the wage
cost equations are highly significant with parameter values of 0.94 in the
sure estimation and 1.00 in the 3sls model. The coefficients of ω  in the total
compensation model are lower with 0.87 in the sure and 0.95 in the 3sls
models suggesting that firms more severly affected by the minimum wage
increase may have cut some components within ’other payments’.
Allowing endogeneity has an impact on the coefficients of productivity in
the wage equations, and labour costs in the employment equations, but the
key parameter β 1 is weakly affected. Our interpretation for the former is
that the sure estimates for productivity capture employment adjustment on
the margin, with little effect on efficiency, rather than rent sharing. This
can be the case for instance if adjustment affects auxliary jobs without
major influence on the productivity of the remaining operations. The lower
wage elasticities of demand (-0.26 significant at the 0.036 level and –0.14
                                               
7 Unionisation is measured as the fraction of workers covered by collective wage
agreements in 1998. This is the latest figure available from Neumann (2002) and
Kertesi and Köllő (2002) both based on National Labour Centre data.
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significant only at the 0.25 level in the wage cost and total compensation
models, respectively) may be explained by the correlation between output
and employment cuts on the one hand and wage growth on the other. The
average wage tends to rise when output and employment are cut and the
average quality of the labour force improves. This correlation is ignored in
the sure estimates where employment is assumed to respond to exogeneous
increases in w holding q constant – this leads to an overestimation of the
wage effect.
If β 1 is indeed measuring compliance it is expected to increase as we move
from low to high levels of unionisation. To test this hypothesis we esti-
mated model (2)-(3) by interacting the minimum wage shock variable with
unionisation by including ∆ ln(ω ), FU, and ∆ ln(ω )× FU to the wage setting
equations. Indeed, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 6 the elasticity of
the wage cost (WC) and total compensation cost (TC) with respect to the
minimum wage shock (denoted with σ  henceforth) increased with FU
though the interaction terms were weakly significant. At low levels of un-
ionisation (0.11, the P25 value of FU) σ
WC = 0.83 and σ
TC =0.72. At the
mean FU of 0.41 σ
WC = 1.04 and σ
TC =1.00. At high levels (0.68, the P75
level of FU) σ
WC = 1.21 and σ
TC =1.24. It seems that non-unionised sectors
found easier to alleviate the cost shock by cutting some side payments
while the highly organised ones experienced more severe wage spillover
effects.
The model also has a message about the aggregate employment effect of
the minimum wage increase – we shall come back to it in Section 4.1. We
do not engage in a detailed account of wage evolutions and spillover effects
either - a brief analysis if presented in the Supplement. (The main finding is
that while the workers directly affected by the minimum wage increase
were found in the 1
st-16
th percentile of the wage distribution wages grew
faster than the average up to the 40
th percentile.) At this point of the analy-
sis the important finding is that, albeit with variations across sectors, the
first minimum wage hike was certainly effective causing an unexpected
and severe shock to the Hungarian labour market.
3. EXPECTED MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS
The government’s motives to radically increase the minimum wage have
never been systematically explored so the observers are free to build their
own hypotheses from fragments of speeches and interviews. The stereotype14
of general support on the political left and opposition on the right does
definitely not help in this case. The hikes were decided by a right-wing
government explicitly committed to increasing the relative welfare of the
middle class and promoting the competitiveness of domestic businesses in-
cluding exporters - an unusual candidate for aggressive minimum wage
policies. At least the first hike was opposed by the largest trade union fed-
eration of socialist orientation (MSZOSZ) worried about the potentially ad-
verse employment effects (Berki, 2003)
A couple of economic arguments seem to have emerged from the political
disputes, however. Among them were that higher minimum wages were
’required’ by the EU to rule out unfair competition and promote social co-
hesion. Though this claim have never been documented it is credible and
also familiar from the Indonesian and Puerto Rican cases where similar
pressures on the part of the US and the trade organisations played an im-
portant role.
The main line of the argument layed elsewhere. It was repeatedly argued by
the prime minister and other government officials that while the effect of
the minimum wage increase on labour demand should be negligible it
stimulates work effort, leads to higher productivity, makes it easier to hire
additional workers, and by widening the gap between benefits and wages
creates proper incentives for paid employment, labour force participation,
and job search. The arguments were typically presented in popular form:
the minimum wage will ‘restore the prestige of work’, combat the idleness
of benefit recipients, ‘whiten the black economy’, and so on. However, be-
hind the slogans it is not so difficult to recognise some key arguments of
the ‘new economics of the minimum wage’ providing support to such ex-
pectations.
Most, if not all, models calling into question the conventional wisdom of
negative employment effects of the minimum wage abandon the assump-
tion of an infinitely elastic supply curve facing the firm. The benchmark
model assuming a positively sloped labour supply curve is that of a local
monopsony. Since the firm is the only buyer on the market it can hire addi-
tional workers by increasing the wage. If, as generally assumed, the mar-
ginal worker’s wage can be increased only if the wages of other workers
are increased too, the firm’s marginal expenditure on labour (MEL) curve is
steeper than its supply curve. Employment is set at the point where MEL
equals the marginal revenue product while the wage is set at the lowest
level compatible with that level of employment given the supply curve. A
minimum wage increase can effectively decrease the firm’s marginal ex-
penditure on labour and lead to a concomittant increase in wages and em-15
ployment at the cost of the monopsony rent. A ‘too high’ minimum wage
hike, however, may shift MEL upwards in the vicinity of the current em-
ployment level and result in a loss of jobs.
The modern theories developed to understand why the employment effects
are often small or even positive are generalisations of the monopsony
model in several ways. The motivation to develop such models rooted in
empirical findings from the 1980s and 1990s calling into question that a
high minimum wage kills jobs. In fact, the theoretical models of a positive
employment effect were developed many years before the supporting evi-
dence was available. In a partial equilibrium model incorporating the sup-
ply side and labour turnover Mincer (1976) showed that depending on how
the turnover rate and the elasticities of demand and supply relate to each
other employment can increase, and unemployment can fall, as a result of a
minimum wage hike.
8  Among the pioneering works mentioned in Brown’s
(1999) overview is the model of Pettengil (1981) predicting positive em-
ployment effect under efficiency wage setting. The search friction models
of Mortensen (1988) and Burdett and Mortensen (1989) were also ready for
use before a series of studies including Card (1992a,b), Katz and Krueger
(1992) and Card and Krueger (1994) opened new chapter in the study of
minimum wages.
These studies summarised in Card and Krueger (1995) called the attention
to the benefits from carefully designed quasi-experiments where an appro-
priate control for unrelated disturbances is achieved by an appropriate ex-
periment desighn rather than sophisticated and therefore vulnerable
econometrics. Empirically, these papers together with Machin and Man-
ning (1994) Dolado et al. (1996) and others showed weak, zero, or even
positive effect of increasing the minimum wage while the time-series re-
sults from this period also suggested much weaker effects than previously
(Brown, 1999). This challenge gave new impetus to both the empirical and
the theoretical research of minimum wages and also affected the political
debate over the issue.
It was recognised that the logics underlying the benchmark monopsony
model can be applied to a wide variety of market structures. While single-
employer towns are indeed rare quite many firms can be the only buyer of
certain skills in the local labour market thus the monopsony model can hold
without any major modification. Mobility costs provide a degree of monop-
sony power to nearly all enterprises. A multitude of firms can be supply-
                                               
8 For employment to be higher and unemployment lower s>η >σ  should hold where σ  is
the turnover rate, and η  and s are the demand and supply elasticities respectively.16
constrained by search frictions - inasmuch as a minimum wage increase re-
duces these frictions by encouraging job search and promoting competition
for job openings it can have positive impact on employment even if some
firms go bankrupt. (Ahn and Arcidiacono, 2003). If workers respond to an
increase of the minimum wage by increasing their effort as in the efficiency
wage models of Rebitzer and Taylor (1991) wages, productivity and em-
ployment can rise. A higher minimum wage enforces the managers to
search for well-functioning incentive schemes, something they were not so
deeply interested to do before, and in this sense the minimum wage hike
can be interpreted as a cause of higher employment. Distortions on the la-
bour market can also drive the outcome far from the competitive predic-
tions. In the monopsonistic competion model of Bashkar and To (1999) the
direction of change depends on the share of fixed costs with higher shares
predicting an increase in employment and vice versa. In a model of dual
wage determination with minimum wages set by the government and other
wages negotiated in a Nash-bargain Cahuc et al (2001) find positive em-
ployment effect under the condition that low-wage and hogh-wage workers
are highly substitutable.
The competitive theory has not been overthrown by these theoretical inno-
vations – neither were its predictions discredited by the above-mentioned
findings. The Card-Krueger results were themselves subject to criticism by
Neumark and Wascher (1992) and others, and a whole array of papers found
significant negative impact of higher minimum wages including Deere,
Murphy and Welch (1996) and Neumark and Wascher (2002) in the US;
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis ( 1999) in a US-France comparison; Bell
(1997) and Maloney and Mendez (2003) in Columbia; Carneiro (2000) in
Brazil; Freeman and Castillo-Freeman (1991) in Puerto Rico; El Hamidi
and Terrell (1997) in Costa Rica (for the upper tiers of the industrial mini-
mum wage/average ratios); Pereira (1999) in Portugal (for teenagers); Rama
(2000) and Alatas and Cameron (2003) in Indonesia (for small firms). The
effects found in these papers are often small in magnitude, restricted to cer-
tain segments of the market, but definitely not positive or zero.
The Hungarian government’s assuption of no effect on demand, or demand
effect fully offset by the reduction of search frictions and increase in effort,
were thus rather brave ones. The available evidence on the wage elasticity
of labour demand suggested that firms are responsive to wages particularly
in the low-wage segment of the market. Estimating dynamic conditional la-
bour demand equations for homogeneous labour Kőrösi (1998, 2000) found
relatively low but significantly negative short-run elasticities during the
transition period. His preferred specification suggested short-run wage17
elasticities of between –0.55 and –0.65 in 1992-95 but only –0.31 and –
0.33 in 1996-97. Estimates for heterogeneous labour are available in an
earlier work by the authors of this paper. The model in Kertesi and Köllő
(2002b) distinguished four factors of production (unskilled and two types
of skilled labour plus capital) and assumed optimal choice under translog
technology. The repeated cross-section estimation of the optimal cost share
equations for firms employing at least 300 workers provided rather high
own-wage elasticities for 1996-1999. The mean elasticities were –0.8 for
skilled and –1.4 for unskilled labour. Given these elasticities, for
employment to increase after doubling the minimum wage the supply side
should be highly responsive in order to offset the fall in demand. The
forthcoming sections try to measure up how this bold experiment suceeded.
4. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The minimum wage increase of January 2001 coincided with a sudden
break in the growth of aggregate employment as shown in Figure 3. The
dotted line depicts seasonally adjusted employment in the non-agricultural
private sector in 1998–2002.
9 The path of employment growth prior to
2001 ccould be precisely approximated with a quadratic form (4672*t-
28.5*t
2, R
2=0.98) indicated by the solid curve. Employment growth was
gradually slowing down in the period considered with the monthly growth
rates falling from 0.027% in 1998–1999 to 0.018% in 2000. Had this trend
continued in 2001-2002, as depicted by the extrapolated part of the curve,
aggregate employment should have grown further by 2.8%. The deviation
of employment from its preceding path starting from January 2001 (month
36, indicated by the vertical line) is easy to observe in the graph.
This remains true if we consider the path of employment relative to GDP.
Prior to the first quarter of 2001 the economy followed a path at which 1%
growth of GDP was associated with 0.5 % growth of employment as shown
in Figure 4. The chart has GDP on the horizontal axis and employment on
the vertical axis, both normalized to their 1997 4
th quarter levels. The rate
of GDP growth is captured by the distance between the vertical lines sepa-
                                               
9 Though the LFS results are published quarterly the data allow the calculation of
monthly employment levels. The data used here were seasonally adjusted at the Na-
tional Bank of Hungary. The authors are greatful to Barnabás Ferenczi of the Bank
for sharing the adjusted series. The seasonally adjusted quarterly figures relating to
the whole economy, as published by the Central Statistical Office, depict a similar
path of employment.18
rating the years (with larger distances indicating faster growth) while the
relation between employment and GDP is captured by the slope of the fit-
ted line. For lack of monthly GDP data we now turn to quarterly figures.
The economy was slowing down in 2001 (as well as in 2000 relative to
1999) but a moderate fall of employment in that year (-0.2 per cent) was
clearly at odds with the experience of the preceding years. Had the econ-
omy remained on its path followed in 1998-2000 employment should have
risen by about 1.7 % in 2001 and 1.8% in 2002, at the given rates of GDP
growth.
The contribution of the minimum wage increase to the slow-down of em-
ployment growth is difficult to assess. Some priors can be based on the in-
dustry-level results for 2001 presented in Table 6. We found that the varia-
tions in the growth of actual labour costs were equiproportional to the exo-
geneous variations implied by the minimum wage increase (ω ), therefore
the wage elasticities of the employment equations could be directly used to
calculate an employment effect. Depending on which concept is accepted
as the relevant measure of labour costs the wage elasticities of labour de-
mand were –0.27 and –0.14 (the latter being weakly significant). The 57
per cent increase of the minimum wage was estimated to raise the average
wage by 2.33 per cent therefore the implied immediate employment loss
could be between 0.63 and 0.32 per cent. Even if we accept the seemingly
unrelated regressions estimates of the wage elasticity of employment (about
–0.4) the implied effect should be slightly below 1 per cent.
The aggregate effect at constant output can be interpreted as a downward
shift in the trend of employment growth already touched upon in Figure 3.
Figure 6 shows the graph redrawn under the assumptions that labour costs
are best approximated by wage costs and their effect on employment is best
captured by the 3sls estimates. Three vertical lines indicate the middle of
2000 and 2001 with the date of the minimum wage increase in the centre.
Aggregate employment was expected to approach the new trend by about
June-July 2001 – the mid-point of the period considered in our estimates
using annual data. Employment was indeed very close to this level in the
middle of 2001 but continued to move away from the growth path charac-
teristic of the previous years.
The increase in the minimum wage may have destroyed jobs in the micro-
firm sector and the public sector excluded from the estimates with the for-
mer having a 14 per cent share in employment and 23 per cent share in
low-wage employment, and the latter having a 25 per cent share in both19
total and low-wage employment.
10 We think that a 0.63 per cent rate of job
loss should be regarded as an upper bound estimate for the two left-out
sectors. Therefore, with the aggregate data at hand we can only give an up-
per-bound guesstimate for the contribution of the minimum wage hike that
predictably did not exceed  0.63 per cent affecting less than 23,000 jobs on
the short run. The longer-run effect and the contribution of the minimum
wage increase to a slow-down of GDP growth requires an extended period
of observation and new, preferably panel, data.
11
A minor aggregate effect does not exclude that some categories of labour
were severely hurt. The grouped data introduced in Tables 1 and 4 suggest
that a category’s exposure to the minimum wage shock was closely related
to its subsequent change of employment. This is shown in Figure 5 where
the 60 groups were plotted by their exposure to the minimum wage in-
crease (ω ) and change of employment between the 4
th quarters of 2000 and
2001. The slopes of the best-fitting lines were then estimated for all groups
and 40 unskilled groups.
12 Both the weighted and the unweighted regres-
sions are presented in Table 7. The weighted LFS data suggest employment
elasticities with respect to ω  of –0.45 for all groups and –1.29 for unskilled
groups. The unweighted estimates are higher but follow similar patterns in
indicating larger differences within unskilled labour.
The patterns observed in 2000-2001 cannot be attributed to secular trends.
As shown in Table 8, the groups exposed to strong minimum wage shock
in 2001 actually had average or better than average employment records in
the preceding years. In 1998–1999 the group level ω -s (as of 2000) and
employment change were uncorrelated while in 1999–2000 low-wage
groups experienced a rise in their relative employment probabilities.
13 An-
                                               
10 The calculation is based on the LFS Supplementary Survey of 2001 April-June.
‘Low-wage’ denotes a gross monthly wage below Ft 40,000.
11 In the industry panel of 2000-2001 the direct effect of ω  on output appears to be in-
significant in OLS regressions with or without controls.
12 Unlike in Figure 5, the LFS-based regressions have employment levels on the left
hand, controlled for change in the number of working age adults who do not attend
school as full-time students and do not recieve old-age pension. This is required be-
cause the rotation of the LFS sample leads to random variations in the size of the
groups observed and therefore their levels of employment. The coefficients of this
variable are close to unity as expected under random fluctuations in group size. For
lack of sufficient observations workers above the retirement age had to be dropped.
The number of old-age employees observed in the 12 region-education cells ranged
between 3 and 71 in 2000 4
th quarter, for instance
 .
13 The equations include a dummy to control for the fact that the employment of work-
ers older than 55 increased substantially in 1999-2000 when the retirement age was
increased by one year (61 for men and 57 for women).20
other argument against interpreting the observed correlations as minimum
wage effects refers to the potentially non-neutral impact of the recession
following 11 September 2001. However, similarly to the aggregate statis-
tics presented earlier, the grouped LFS data suggest that low-wage em-
ployment started to fall immediately after the minimum wage hike. This is
supported by the calculations underlying Table 9. The employment ratios
of the 60 groups, normalised to their 2000. 4
th quarter levels and expressed
in logs, were regressed on ln(ω ) in panels comprising quarters 1, 1-2, 1-3
and 1-4, respectively. The estimation was repeated for 40 groups of un-
skilled labour. The coefficients of ω  were weakly affected by the extension
of the panel period in both models.
The descriptive statistics reviewed in this section seem to show that em-
ployment was adversely affected by the first minimum wage hike. Aggre-
gate employment did not remarkably fall in absolute terms in 2001 but de-
viated from its path followed in the preceding years. Groups exposed to
stronger shock had less favourable employment records compared to other
groups and their own past experience. The data revealed particularly large
differences within unskilled labour by age and region. The question of cau-
sality remains open, however. The possibility that employment evolutions
were driven by shocks other than the minimum wage increase can not be
ruled out using aggregate or grouped data. Finding the locus for a deeper
analysis is the last preparatory step addressed before we start.
Most empirical studies of the minimum wage effect concentrate on youth
employment and low-wage industries in both the US and Europe. We shall
deviate from this tradition because the data summarised in Table 10 and 11
hint at more important dimensions in the Hungarian context. The logit
model of Table 10 estimates the probability that a worker observed in the
WS in May 2000 earned less than Ft 38,685, that is, was presumably af-
fected by the minimum wage increase six months later. All the explanatory
variables are dummies and the coefficients are expressed as odds ratios.
The parameters on personal characteristics and industrial affiliation depict a
familiar picture: females, young and unskilled workers, those employed in
high-unemployment regions are more likely to earn subminimum wages,
and so do employees in the light industry, trade, hotels and restaurants,
road transport, and services. No, or very few, low-wage workers are found
in petroleum mining and refining, banking, R&D, public transport, and the
tobacco industry.
14
                                               
14 An extraordinary parameter (or=70.9) on Insurance signals that the agents are typi-
cally paid the minimum wage as the fixed part of their remuneration.21
Budapest and the regions around Lake Balaton, Hungary’s major tourist
zone, have relatively high fractions of low-wage workers. In these cases we
suspect that many of these employees are only registered as minimum-
wage workers and paid partly in cash.
More important than this is what the firm-level variables suggest. The frac-
tion of low-wage workers sharply increases as we move from the reference
category of large firms employing more than 3,000 workers. The odds ra-
tios are 3.0 for medium sized firms (50-300 workers), and as high as 6.6
and 12.4 for the two categories of small firms, with 21-50 and 5-20 em-
ployees respectively. Similarly important is the firm’s productivity level.
Starting from the most productive ¼ of firms the odds ratios jump from 1 to
1.6, 3.1 and 7.8 in the 2
nd-4
th quartiles. The inclusion of firm size and pro-
ductivity to the model increases its pseudo-R
2 from .18 to .35, and a model
with only these two variables has a better fit (.24) than a model with the
remaining 63 variables.
Table 11 based on the WS and the LFS Supplementary Survey of April-
June 2001 looks at the composition of minimum wage workers in 2001, a
few months after the first hike. The composition of low-wage employment
by gender, education, age, and experience is surprisingly balanced. Women
are slightly over-represented with 54 and 56 per cent shares in the two data
sets. The vast majority (¾) of the minimum wage workers are prime-age
(25-54); only 1/5 is under 25; and teenagers account for less than 2 per
cent. Half of the minimum wage workers have more than 20 years of expe-
rience and only less than 10 per cent entered the labour market 0-4 years
before the survey date. Workers with primary, vocational, and secon-
dary/higher education have roughly 30, 40, and 30 per cent shares, respec-
tively. Married couples without children (38 per cent) and young adults
living with their parents (19 per cent) form large groups of the minimum
wage workers but 35 per cent are parents of one or several children.
By contrast, a high concentration of minimum wage workers can be ob-
served in jobs with short tenures. About 20-25 per cent of the minimum
wage workers have tenures (t) shorter than a year; 38 per cent have t<2, and
60 per cent have t<5 (while only 4.4 per cent of them spent less than 5
years on the labour market).
Tenure also has a strong impact on the probability of being paid at or be-
low the minimum wage. In simple byvariate probits P(w<1.05w*)=Φ  (ten-
ure, experience) estimated with data of the LFS Supplementary Survey
sample the marginal effects turn out to be -.028 for tenure and .003 for ex-22
perience. In univariate estimates the marginals are -.024 and -.0007, re-
spectively.
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Finally, Table 11 also calls the attention to the importance of small firms in
the low-wage segment of the labour market. About 15-20 per cent of the
minimum wage workers are employed in micro-firms with less than 5 em-
ployees. Excluding this category, for which further data are not available,
we get that half of the minimum wage workers work in small firms with 5-
20 employees as opposed to their 20 per cent share in employment.
We conclude from these data that the study of minimum wage effects
should primarly focus on small and/or low-income firms on the one hand,
and the entry and exit portals of internal labour markets on the other. If
anywhere, a ‘too high’ minimum wage is expected to reduce employment
in the small firm (low-income) sector, and exert influence on the flows
between employment and non-employment. These, rather than teenage em-
ployment or the low-skilled labour market in general seem to be the ade-
quate fields for the empirical ivestigation.
Data availability restricts us to address only three questions within this
broad area. In section 4.2. we analyse a short panel of 1,818 small firms
drawn from the 2000 and 2001 waves of the WS to see how firms’ expo-
sure to the minimum wage hike affected their wages, output, and employ-
ment in 2001. Section 4.3. compares the jobloss probabilities of workers
who are paid exactly the minimum wage with those earning slightly more
than that. At this aim we follow 16,429 individuals observed in the LFS
Supplementary Survey of 2001 2
nd quarter. Finally, in Section 4.4. we
compare the flows from insured unemployment to employment of low-
wage and high-wage workers using a panel of monthly data from 171 la-
bour offices covering January 1998 – March 2002.
4.2. EMPLOYMENT IN SMALL FIRMS 2000–2001
In analysing the impact of the 2001 minimum wage hike on small-firm em-
ployment we share the assumptions describing the imperfectly competitive
firm. Our enterprises employing 5-20 workers hardly behave as monopso-
nies; are likely to face highly (albeit not infinitely) elastic labour supply
and product demand curves. The minimum wage hike forced the vast ma-
jority of these firms
16 to choose between paying more to their low-wage
                                               
15 The estimations are available on request.
16 Prior to the 2001 minimum wage increase 25.6  per cent of the small firms had no di-
rectly affected workers at all (F=0); 17 per cent had F=1; while 57.6 per cent of them23
workers or dismissing them with or without additional layoffs affecting
high-wage employees.
Chart 1: Responses to a minimum wage shock
The firm’s response to a given shock affects the average wage, employ-
ment, and output simultaneously as shown in Chart 1. Consider the sim-
plest case when ω  measures the shock to a firm employing workers with a
particular type of skill that is the only input. Even though labour is homo-
geneous in terms of skills wage dispersion may arise as a result of on-the-
job training (individual productivity differentials) or Becker-Stigler type
bonding. When the minimum  wage is increased some workers are affected
and the increase of the average wage by ω  drives the firm out of its pre-
hike equilibrium denoted with E. What happens afterwards depends on the
nature of wage dispersion on the one hand, and complementarities and sub-
stitution on the other. If all workers are equally productive but wages differ
because of bonding, and the firm insists on its bonding scheme, only an
employment effect will work that will drive the firm from M to A.
17 In
other cases the firm will substitute low-productivity (low-wage) for high-
productivity (high-wage) workers – this will result in ∆ w>ω , a growth in
productivity, while output and employment will be affected by both sub-
stitution and scale effects (M ! B, M! C). If low-wage and high-wage la-
bour are complements the firm can also react to the minimum wage shock
by dismissals biased against high-wage workers – this can result in ∆ w<ω
                                                                                                                                         
had some low-wage workers (F=47 per cent on average). Author’s calculation from
the WS, May 2000.











and a major fall in output. (M! D). Finally, the firm can choose to cut the
unregulated components of employee compensation and achieve ∆ w<ω
without productivity loss, at least on the short run (M! F). On the long run
it risks losing its low-wage workers to other firms.
Two things are clear even from this basic example. First, the identification
of the impact of the minimum wage increase on small firms requires a
model accounting for the endogeneity of wages, employment, and output.
The firm’s choice over its responses depends on substitution and comple-
mentarities that we can not directly observe but the changes in the compo-
sition of the labour force and hence productivity can be indirectly taken
into account through incorporating output to the model. Second, in order to
capture the relation between ∆ L and ω  we need to control for offsets. We
assume that offsets are less likely with profitable firms able to share their
income with their employees; if quits put the firm’s ongoing capital in-
vestments at risk; and in a low-wage environment where failures to pay the
new minimum wage menace with the quitting of core workers. Therefore
we estimate a two-equations system:
where c is log change of the PPI-adjusted labour cost, K is log change of
the capital stock; π
0 denotes profit in the base period, L is employment, q is
the PPI-adjusted log change in value added; and X, Z, and Y denote exoge-
neous controls. The wage setting equation is controled for region effects
(X, 17 dummies), the employment equation includes the base period capi-
tal-labour ratio (Z, under the assumption that capital intensive firms are less
likely to react with dismissals on the short run), and a dummy for Lake
Balaton. Ten industry dummies (Y) are included into the system as addi-
tional exogoneous regressors. The minimum wage shock is interacted with
dummies for the 1
st-4
th quartiles of micro-regions by unemployment al-
lowing ω  to have different coefficients in high- and low-wage environ-
ments. ββββ 1 is a parameter vector with the coefficients expectedly rising as
we move towards high-unemployment regions. In high-unemployment re-
gions a large fraction of unskilled labour, including core workers, were af-
fected by the minimum wage hike therefore we expect stronger compli-
ance. We estimate the system with three-stage least squares regressions
treating L, q, and c as endogeneous.
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Data
As an exception to the general sampling rule of the Wage Survey firms
employing 5-20 workers are expected to report data on each of their em-
ployees. The firms are randomly selected within four-digit industries.
18 In
this particular size category, covering 20 per cent of aggregate employment
in the enterprise sector, we can precisely measure the fraction of low-wage
workers within the firm and also have hope to observe at least some enter-
prises before and after the minimum wage increase.
Given the Wage Survey’s target population of small firms and a sampling
quota of roughly 12% we would expect that about 350 firms could be fol-
lowed in a short panel. In fact, the number of small enterprises observed in
both 2000 and 2001 amounted to 2,008. This regrettably calls into question
the alleged independence of the cross-section samples but fortunately pro-
vides us with a sizable longitudinal sample drawn from a populace of firms
heavily exposed to the minimum wage shock. Out of the 2,008 firms 1,818
had all the variables required for the estimation.
The probits in Table  12 check how the estimation sample was selected
from the base-period population of 2,874 small firms observed in the 2000
wave of the WS. Firms also observed in 2001 tend to be larger, generating
profit in the base period; and have less workers paid below the new mini-
mum wage. The dropouts were presumably hit harder by the minimum
wage hike therefore our model underestimates the extent and potentially
adverse implications of the minimum wage shock. The estimation sample
within the panel is also biased for larger firms and profit makers but does
not systematically differ from the rest of the sample in terms of the base-
period fraction of low-wage workers.
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics of the estimation sample. The
median firm had 13 employees, of which 5 was paid below the new mini-
mum wage, and was hit by an average wage shock of 11.2 per cent. Table
14 gives an overview of changes between 2000 and 2001 broken down by
the size of the minimum wage shock (zero, 0-10, 10-25, and over 25 per
cent). Real labour costs grew by 6.2, 9.1, 27.9 and 30.5 per cent, respec-
tively,  while employment changed by +4.5, -0.7, -5.4 and –9 per cent.
Results
Table 15 presents the estimates of equations (4)-(5) based on unweighted
and weighted (with base-period employment) data. We refer to the un-
                                               
18 As discussed in the Data Appendix all Hungarian firms above this size category are
obliged to fill in the WS questionnaire but they are expected to provide individual
data on only (roughly) 10% sample of their workers.26
weighted results. The wage setting equation suggests that the elasticities of
real labour costs with respect to the minimum wage shock ranged between
0.6 and 0.9 with high-unemployment regions having higher elasticities.
Growth in the capital stock and base-period profits also have the expected
sign though the latter is not significant.
19 The labour demand equation sug-
gests an output elasticity of 0.33 and a labour cost elasticity of –0.37.
Firms by Lake Balaton had larger employment losses presumably because
many of them took their minimum wage workers off the payroll and con-
tinued to pay them in cash or on contract basis – a common practice in this
tourist zone where firms themselves have substantial intakes in cash. Capi-
tal-intensive firms reduced employment less than others.
What can be told about the magnitude of the minimum wage effect using
these estimates? The impact can be approximated with β 1j⋅α 2 for region
quartile j. In high-unemployment regions an 1 per cent average wage
growth implied by the minimum wage hike reduced employment by 0.33
per cent while the elasticities were –0.28 and –0.22 in the 2
nd-3
rd and the 1
st
quartiles. (The weighted estimates are very close to these values except in
the 4
th quartile where it is reduced to –0.29.) A low-wage firm (F>0.25,
ϖ =.36) with 17 employees, located in a low-unemployment region was es-
timated to lose 1.2 jobs as a result of the minimum wage hike while its
counterpart operating in a high-unemployment area lost 2 jobs. The differ-
ences in case of 10-25 per cent share of low-wage workers (ϖ =.165) were
obviously lower with implied losses of 0.6 and 0.9 jobs. At the average
shock (ϖ =.119) and elasticity (β 1.⋅α 2=-.282) the loss amounted to 0.57 jobs.
Firms with 5-20 workers had a combined employment of 328,00 in the base
period. Our estimates suggest that the minimum wage hike eliminated
about 11,000 jobs in this sector – a huge loss in Hungarian context.
20
The employment losses of low-wage small firms in 2001 were at odds with
their previous employment histories. In a similar panel of 1,046 small firms
observed in the 1999 and 2000 waves of the WS the log change of em-
ployment regressed on F (fraction low-wage in May 2000) yields a pa-
rameter of 0.0875 (1.49) while a similar univariate regression yields -.1063
(4.01) in the 2000-2001 panel.
21
                                               
19 The system was also estimated with Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions with
almost identical result in the wage setting equation.
20 In these calculations we take into account that the direct impact of ω  on q was isig-
nificant as suggested by a parameter of 0.009 (0.14) in the first-stage regression.
21 The data and the results are available on request.27
A puzzle to be solved before accepting these results is the apparent devia-
tion of changes in output from changes in employment, and the nature of
productivity growth, in small firms hit by strong minimum wage shock. In
the most affected group of firms productivity grew by  8.8 per cent in a
year. (In the other three groups it changed by –1.3, -0.2, and 4.3 per cent as
we move from low to high ω -s). How can we explain this ‘miracle’? The
most popular answer to the question is that these firm took their workers
off the payroll and continued to pay them in cash or kind, or by purchasing
their ‘business services’ on the market. However, in this case their material
costs and other, unspecified costs should have increased. This was not the
case, as shown in Table 14 – the share of non-wage costs in total costs ac-
tually decreased by 1.8 percentage points in the most affected group. By
contrast, we find evidence that the composition of employment changed in
favour of more educated and non-manual workers in these enterprises (Ta-
ble 16). Table 17 furthermore suggests that more affected firms employed
more high-wage workers in 2001 than expected on the basis of their wage
distribution of 2000. Whether a 2.2 percentage points drop in the share of
low-skilled workers, a 3 percentage points growth in the share of white
collars, and a 4.8 percentage points increase in the share of high-wage
workers can explain a nearly nine per cent increase of output per worker
remains an open question. The possibility that increased effort and better
incentives played a role, as proposed in efficiency wage models, can not be
excluded.
The sampling rule of the WS does not allow a comparison with larger firms
(the number of individual observations is insufficient for calculating F or
ω ) except for enterprises employing more than 500, thus reporting data on
50 or more, workers. As shown in Table 18 the low-wage large firms had
better than average employment records in 1999-2000, and worse than av-
erage in 2000-2001 but the estimates are not significant at conventional
levels in the small samples of 337 and 332 firms, respectively.
4.3. THE JOBLOSS RISKS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS, 2001
Textbook competitive theory predicts that the firm will no longer employ
its workers directly affected by the introduction of a biting minimum wage.
There are many reasons why this is not the case in practice ranging from
the costs of dismissals to monopsony power. Nevertheless the workers di-
rectly affected by a minimum wage hike are at exceptionally high risk of
jobloss in a competitive labour market since their employers are obliged to
pay them more than their original wages adjusted to their marginal revenue
product.28
A minimum wage hike decided somewhere at a government office desk
randomly divides the low-wage population into two parts. Workers whose
pre-hike wage was just above the new minimum are likely to have similar
human capital endowments and occupational characteristics to those who
earned just below the line but their employers have no straightforward mo-
tivation to disemploy them as they are continued to be paid at their mar-
ginal product. These workers can also be indirectly affected because of
wage spillovers (the firm’s insistence to its system of relative wages) or be-
cause the firm’s demand falls for the whole category of labour they belong
to. Still there is likely to be a difference in the jobloss probabilities of those
directly affected and those who are not, or only indirectly, influenced.
Following this line of reasoning in this section we utilise information on
the wages of 16,429 full-time employees interviewed in the LFS Supple-
mentary Survey of 2001 2
nd quarter. We distinguish workers who were paid
exactly the new minimum wage (treatment group) from those who earned
slightly more than that (control group), and estimate the two group’s job-
loss probabilities in 2001 using a discrete time duration model. Our ap-
proach is similar to that of Currie and Fallick (1996) and Abowd et al.
(1997) both comparing workers paid the minimum wage with those earning
just above the limit.
As shown in Jenkins (1995) by chosing the quarterly employment spells of
workers belonging to the risk group as the units of observation the exit haz-
ard from a stock sample can be estimated with logit augmented with a
baseline hazard function f(t):
where t and τ  denote time spent in the job, X stands for individual and en-
viromental characteristics, w denotes a set of wage level dummies, and q
represents calendar time. In a discrete time duration model each individual
contributes to the sample likelihood with as many spells of observed out-
come as he/she spent in the risk group after the date of stock sampling.
Censored observations are those with an unknown outcome due to dropout
from the rotating panel. Censoring is achieved via exclusion of the spell
from the estimation sample. The baseline hazard is customarly captured by
duration dummies or assuming a functional form of the distribution of
completed spells (usually exponential or Weibull).
Among the Xs we include gender, age, job characteristics, union member-
ship, type of work contract, local unemployment, and industry dummies. A
set of dummies stand for the wage of the observed individuals in April-
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June 2001. For reasons presented later we distinguish between workers
paid in a 10 per cent range of the minimum wage, those earning 110-125
per cent of the minimum, and three other categories earning even higher
wages. Calendar time is captured by quarter dummies and f(t) is also ap-
proximated with quarterly duration dummies in the first version of the
model where all workers are followed by the end of 2001.
The reason of not following the sample for the longest possible period al-
lowed by the LFS design (5 quarters) is that the second minimum wage
shock exposed our control group to the same type of risk that hit the treat-
ment group in 2001.
The motivation to estimate two versions of the model originates in the
conjecture that particularly low wages and high jobloss probabilities mutu-
ally depend on each other in the low-wage, high-mobility segment of the
labour market. Workers in marginal jobs change employer rather fre-
quently, flow in and out of employment, tend to have short tenures at any
given point of time, and earn low wages. In order not to confuse the causal
effect with this sort of spurious correlation we also estimate model (6) for
workers who spent at least 2 years in their jobs prior to the survey date.
To distinguish between flows to unemployment versus non-participation
we estimate multinomial logits with duration dummies, treating tenures
longer than18 months as the reference (whole sample) and assuming expo-
nential baseline hazard (tenure>2 years). 
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Before we come to data description and estimation a few paragraphs should
be devoted to justify our choice of the treatment and control groups. At this
aim we use a quasi-panel of individuals covering full-time employees ob-
served in the 2000 and 2001 waves of the Wage Survey. Individuals cannot
be directly identified across  waves but one can try to match workers em-
ployed by the same firm in year t and t+1 who have the same gender, year
of birth, level of education (9 grades), and 4-digit occupational code. In this
way 52,057 workers observed in 2000 could be identified in the 2001 sam-
ple. For reasons explained by the WS survey design the panel is biased for
small-firm employees that we do not correct in the forthcoming rough cal-
culations. The important point we wish to check using this panel is how the
minimum wage workers of 2001, and those earning slightly more, were re-
cruited from the employed population of 2000. For each worker we know
his/her gross earnings of May 2001 and thus whether or not he/she was di-
                                               
22 Allowing flexible baseline hazard by using year dummies results in drop-outs from
the estimation sample because of failures completely determined in some duration
categories.30
rectly affected by the minimum wage increase. 
23 As shown in Table 19  as
much as 83.6 per cent of the treatment group was estimated to be affected
but only 54.4 per cent of the population analogous to our control group was
unaffected. The control group is thus far from being the ideal one but we
are not deeply concerned with it because, since the vast majority of the
misclassified workers are found in the control group, our model underesti-
mates the treatment effect and thus provides a fortiori results. 
24 The fact
that the second minimum wage hike became a credible promise (threat) by
the Autumn of 2001 also biases the observed treatment effect downwards.
Data
We use the LFS Supplementary Survey of 2001 April-June – the only wave
since 1993 when respondents were asked about wages. A total of 22,416
employees provided wage data. We accepted the gross wage figure as re-
ported by the respondents, or estimated from the net figure by the CSO.
25
Five wage categories were distinguished: below thousand Ft 36, 36-44
(treatment), 44-50 (control), 50-75, 75-100, and over 100. Setting a rela-
tively broad bracket for the treatment group is explained by the fact that the
reported LFS figures relate to total monthly earnings subject to both ran-
dom and permanent variations around the base wage.
26
Workers were followed in the 3
rd and 4
th quarters of 2001. The Hungarian
LFS is a rotating panel with 1/6 of the sample leaving the survey each
quarter. Excluding part-timers (workers who customarly work less than 6
hours a day), and the spells ending in dropout, we got to an estimation
sample of 28,315 quarterly spells for all workers and 22,315 spells for
workers with a tenure longer than two years. The descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 20. A total of 1.68 and 1.1 per cent of the observed
spells ended in exit from employment in the two samples. The treatment
groups comprised 18.7 and 15.2 per cent, respectively, while the control
                                               
23 Those earning less than Ft 38,685 in May 2000 are assumed to have been affected.
Workers were assigned to the treatment and control groups on the basis of their total
gross earnings in May 2001 – the variable available in the LFS of April-June 2001.
24 Reducing the proportion of misclassified workers by shifting the wage bracket (now
110-125 per cent) upwards seems to us a mistaken strategy – what is gained in terms
of more precise classification is likely lost in terms of comparability.
25 The gross figure is what labour contracts include in Hungary.
26 Workers earning below Ft 36,000 were excluded from the estimation sample because
this category includes many workers planning to retire. Furthermore, the WS Indi-
vidual Panel showed high mobility between this and other wage brackets suggesting
that sub-minimum wages are often explained by temporary reasons.31
groups contained 9.8 and 9.3 per cent. Workers in the two samples spent
5.9 and 7.3 years in their jobs on average.
Results
The results on the whole sample presented in Table 21 show that males,
prime age and skilled workers, public sector employees, union members,
and those in tenured jobs were less likely to leave employment in July-
December 2001. The baseline hazard for unemployment was falling until
about 9 months spent in the job and was basically flat at longer tenures.
The parameters of our interest are 3.23 (2.75) for the treatment group and
1.95 (1.13) for the control group with respect to exit to unemployment. In
the case of exit to non-participation the parameters were 6.21 (6.85) and
4.49 (3.23). Though the members of the treatment group were more likely
to leave employment the difference between them and the controls were
statistically insignificant as shown by the F-tests for the equality of the pa-
rameters at the bottom of the table.
In Table 22 the dummies for the wage categories are interacted with re-
gional unemployment rates under the expectation that a stronger shock to
the labour market of depressed regions resulted in higher outflows from
employment. Here again, the unemployment-related differentials in the
jobloss probabilities of minimum wage workers seem to be larger than
those between the members of the control group but the coefficients do not
differ from each other at conventional levels of significance.
The results for workers with at least two years of tenure – our prefered
specification - are presented in Tables 23 and 24. In this case we observe
large and statistically significant differences between the treatment and
control groups with respect to exit to unemployment. The respective pa-
rameters are 1.05 (3.00) versus 0.15 (0.31) significantly different at the
0.04 level. The hazards of flows to non-participation are statistically equal
in the two groups.
The regional differences in exit to unemployment within the minimum
wage group also seem larger than those in the control group though in this
case the equality of the coefficients can be rejected only at the 0.09 level,
while the parameters for exit to non-participation are statistically equal.
The estimated quarterly outflow rates for a 25 year old male worker with 5
years of tenure are 0.243 and 0.119 per cent in the treatment and the control
groups, respectively. Both of these rates suggest very long prospective ten-
ures, lasting longer on average than the time until retirement. The fraction
of group members staying in their jobs for the rest of their career (calcu-
lated as (1-h)
40 given a retirement age of 65 and assuming constant hazard)32
is estimated to be 95.3 and 90.7 per cent in the control and treatment
groups, respectively.
The sensitivity of the results to compositional differences between the
treatment and control groups seem minimal. For workers with at least two
years of tenure the exit to unemployment logit has only three significant
parameters: the wage, age, and tenure. The average age of workers in the
treatment (control) groups were 39.2 (40.0) years, and the average tenure
was 6.67 (7.33) years. The predicted exit to unemployment rate setting all
variables at their default and unemployment at zero was 0.0167 in the
treatment group. Using the average age and tenure of the control group the
estimate is practically unchanged (0.0168) while the prediction for the
control group is 0.0068, less than half of the treatment group’s exit rate.
The admittedly small but statistically significant differences encourage us
to conclude that the minimum wage workers, most of them paid above their
marginal product right after the minimum wage increase, had higher prob-
ability of becoming unemployed in July-December 2001 than their obser-
vationally similar counterparts paid marginally higher wages. We also
found weak evidence that the regional differences in the outflow rates of
minimum wage workers were larger than in other wage categories.
4.4. OUTFLOWS FROM UNEMPLOYMENT 1998–2002
A minimum wage hike is expected to reduce the job finding probabilites of
unemployed workers who were paid below the new minimum wage prior to
losing their jobs. Inasmuch as their earnings reflected the employer’s
evaluation of their marginal product they will not be demanded at a signifi-
cantly higher wage.
This, however, is only one side of the coin. A higher minimum wage makes
employment more attractive for the non-employed and encourage them to
look for jobs more actively. The worker’s low pre-unemployment wage is a
wrong signal but only one of the signals the employer takes into considera-
tion at the hiring decision. The expected reduction of voluntary quits and
search frictions, or a prospective increase in work effort, may make the
employment of low-wage workers profitable for the firm after a minimum
wage hike.
Whether the job finding probabilites of low-wage workers were predomi-
nantly shaped by the classic demand-side effect, or by more complex
mechanisms offsetting the adverse impact of the minimum wage shock, is
the third question addressed in detail. At this aim we use a panel compris-
ing 171 labour offices and 51 months from January 1998 to March 2002.33
For each office and month we have an estimate of the number of low-wage
and high-wage workers in the UI stock at the beginning of the month and
their exit to job rates during the month. The same information is available
in a breakdown by educational levels (but we do not know the composition
of skill groups by wage levels and vice versa).
The return to comparing the exit to job rates of low-wage and high-wage
workers is clearly minimal as these groups sharply differ in terms of skill
levels and can be differently affected by aggregate, regional, or industrial
shocks. In order to get closer to what we believe a sensible comparison we
shall study how the exit rates of low-wage workers related to the exit rates
of low-skilled workers before and after the minimum wage hike.
This choice can be justified by data from the NLC Exit to Jobs Survey of
April 2001. The survey covered 9,502 UI recipients finding a job of which
78 per cent was low-skilled (had no certified secondary school education)
and 50 per cent was low-wage (earned less than the median prior to unem-
loyment).
27 The crosstabulation of these two attributes  suggested that the
vast majority (81.4 per cent) of the low-wage workers were low-skilled but
only half of the low-skilled (48.8 per cent) were low-wage.
28 The exit rate
of the whole low-wage group (h
LW) relative to the exit rate of the whole
low-skilled group (h
LS) can therefore be considered a crude approximation
of the wage-level specific job finding rate (h
LW|LS) within the unskilled
group. We expect the h
LW/h
LS ratio to fall after the minimum wage increase
as far as its aftermaths are dominated by demand-side effects. We study the
evolution of the h
LW/h
LS ratio by estimating equation (7).
where h is the exit rate at office i month t, LW and LS refer to low-wage
and low-skilled workers respectively, and MD and YRD are month and year
dummies. The expectation is β <0 because it is more difficult for low-wage
workers to find jobs when the market is depressed and vice versa. The
long-run averages of the office-level h
LW/h
HW ratios can differ depending
on the typical duration of unemployment of the low-wage and unskilled
groups.
29  These fixed effects are captured by ci.
                                               
27 Previous earnings were discounted using the average wage index.
28 If the wage level is inferred from the benefit, as will be done in the forthcoming sec-
tions, the respective proportions are 82.1 and 56.7 per cent.
29 The mean benefit divides the population of UI recipients to fractions of varying size
depending on the regions’ wage level. The difference in the skill endowments of the
median recipient and the median low-wage recipient tends to be smaller in low-wage
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We can suspect that E(Uitvit)≠ 0. Equation (7) is controled for seasonality
and aggregate and regional shocks by the inclusion of the month and year
dummies and regional unemployment. However, some sort of regional
shocks may exert particularly strong impact on the h
LW/h
LS ratios. When
whole plants are closed or opened employers screen their work-
ers/applicants more carefully than they usually do and while doing so inter-
pret low-wages as a signal of low productivity. Since both closures and
openings tend to decrease the h
LW/h
LS ratio but push the unemployment
rate to opposing directions the sign of the correlation between v and U is a
priori indeterminate. (If screening  is particulary strong in cases of clo-
sures, which is likely to be the case, the correlation will be negative). Al-
lowing for the possibility that U and v are correlated Uit was instrumented
with its t-1 and t-2 values.
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Similarly to Deere, Murphy and Welch (1996) we focus on the coefficients
of the year dummies in identifying minimum wage effects. The expectation
is that prior to the minimum wage hike the year effects were weak and
similar in magnitude but there was a significant break in 2001. We also ex-
pect that the relative exit rate of low-wage workers fell more in high-
unemployment regions. Therefore at the second step we interact a dummy
for the post-hike period with dummies for regional unemployment to allow
γ  to differ by regions.
Data
The unemployment insurance (UI) register has the unique advantage of
containing data on the unemployed workers’ pre-unemployment wage lev-
els. The labour offices record the recipients’ earnings in the four calendar
quarters preceding their current unemployment spells. Since the benefits
are earnings-related they also provide an indirect measure and we use them
as a proxy of the wage. Though pre-unemployment earnings are known
they relate to different time periods - computing the present value of past
earnings case by case would have increased the costs of data collection far
beyond the resources at our disposal. We recourse to the NLC Exit to Jobs
Survey of April 2001 again to show how pre-unemployment earnings and
benefits were related. As shown in Table 25 workers recieving lower than
average benefits typically earned less than the median before unemploy-
                                                                                                                                         
regions, which provides an explanation for the regional fixed effects. Regional dif-
ferences in the share of seasonal low-wage industries add a further component to ci.
30 It is worth noting that there is no straightforward link between the flows of the UI
system and unemployment. In 2000, the UI stock accounted for only 47% of  the
stock of ILO-unemloyment. As a result of poor targeting  less than 20% of the ILO-
unemployed received benefit in that year. (MT 2001 227-230).35
ment, and vice versa. (The 2001 March value of the median pre-
unemployment wage was just equal to Ft, 40,000, the new minimum wage).
In this data set 92.3% of the recipients could be correctly classified as ’low-
wage’ or ’high-wage’ on the basis of the benefit.
The evolution of the quarterly relative exit to job rates of low-wage work-
ers are shown in Table 26. Given that the relative job finding probabilities
display strong seasonality the table is organised by years and quarters.
Comparing the quarterly figures columnwise suggests that the relative exit
rate of low-wage workers fell by 7-8% in 2001–2002 compared to job
seekers with primary and/or vocational qualification. Consistently with the
aggregate figures and the LFS data analysed in section 4.1. we observe that
the shift took place immediately after the first minimum wage hike. It
should be noted that the outflow rate of low-wage workers did not change
remarkably in absolute terms. Similarly to the aggregate data the UI figures
display a sudden break in an improving trend and this was particularly the
case with the low-wage UI recipients.
The changes between 2000 and 2001 were not driven by a few outliers: the
annual relative exit to job rate of low-wage workers fell in 75% of the of-
fices representing 81.5% of the UI stock in the base period.
Results
The estimation results are shown in Table 27 (versions A and B). In 2 per
cent of the cases the exit rate of low-wage workers were zero – in version
A these cases were excluded and in version B the zeros were replaced as-
suming the outflow of ½ person. The qualitative results are identical.
The estimates support that the h
LW/h
LS ratios negatively correlated with the
unemployment rate though the respective parameters are weakly signifi-
cant. More importantly, the results suggest that the job finding probability
of the low-wage unemployed relative to the unskilled dropped by 9 per-
centage points in 2001 and further 5 percentage points in January-March
2002.
In Table 28 the pairwise equality of the year effects are tested using the co-
efficients from version B. The parameters for 1999 and 2000 are pairwise
equal, those for 2001 and 2002 are sharply different from each of the year
effects of 1998–2000, and 2001 and 2002 are also different though at a
lower significance level. Treating the pre- and post-hike periods as differ-
ent regimes by estimating the same equation with a dummy for 2001-2002
provides a coefficient of -.0845 (9.38) suggesting that the h
LW/h
LS ratio fell
from 99.1 to 91.1 per cent.36
Interacting this ‘regime dummy’ with dummies for the four quartiles of re-
gional unemployment (treating the h
LW/h
LS ratio of all regions in 1998-2000
as the reference) yields statistically equal parameters for all regions. In
evaluating this result one has to take into account that while the fixed ef-
fects capture the long-term differences in the h
LW/h
LS ratios they do not
control for pthe expected regional variations in the changes of the ratio
when the minimum wage increases. In a low-wage region most unskilled
workers are low-wage therefore h
LW/h
LS changes little when h
LW falls. In
high-wage regions a wage-related shock affects h
LW much stronger than h
LS
so the ratio falls substantially. The bias in the estimated coefficients of the
interactive terms therefore leads to an underestimation of the effect hitting
the low-wage regions. 
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The UI register is incapable of providing a full picture on how the job
finding probabilities of the jobless were changing after the minimum wage
hike. Only 14 per cent of the working age non-employed excluding stu-
dents and pensioners received UI at the eve of 2001 – a small and non-
randomly selected minority.
32 Unfortunately, the LFS provides no data on
the previous wages of the non-employed, preventing the researchers from a
comprehensive study of outflows from non-employment. We see no reason
to assume, however, that the robust changes observed with the insured un-
employed are specific to this particular segment of the labour market.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Every piece of information we could analyse in this paper suggested that
the Hungarian government’s decision to increase the minimum wage by 57
per cent in 2001 implied a loss of employment opportunities. Aggregate
employment did not remarkably fall in absolute terms but deviated from its
path followed in preceding years, as soon as January 2001. This remained
true when the relation of employment growth to GDP growth was consid-
ered. Had the economy remained on its path followed in 1998–2000 em-
ployment should have risen by about 1.7 % in 2001 at the given rate of
                                               
31 It is worth emphasising at this point that the change in the exit rates were clearly
wage-specific rather than skill-related. Estimating equation (7) with h
LS/h
HS on the
left hand (HS:high-skilled) yields a coefficient of 0.0076 (0.51) for 2001-2002. The
contrast between low-wage and high-wage UI recipients was particularly strong as
suggested by a coefficient of -.1739 (6.20) for the ‘regime dummy’ in an equation
with h
LW/h
HW on the left hand
32 Author’s calculation from LFS 2000 4
th quarter.37
GDP growth. It actually fell by 0.4 per cent. Groups exposed to stronger
shock had less favourable employment records compared to other groups
and their own past experience.
The effect of minimum wages on employment was expected to be strongest
in small firms and marginal jobs. We found that small firms exposed to
stronger shock lost more jobs indeed: one per cent average wage increase
implied by the minimum wage hike reduced their level of employment by
0.22-0.33 per cent depending on region. The employment records of the los-
ers were at odds with their development in previous years. Similarly to the
papers by Rama (2000) and Alatas and Cameron (2003) on the Indonesian
case, the closest analouge to Hungary’s minimum wage experiment, we
found no significant link between exposure to the minimum wage hike and
subsequent employment change with large firms. For lack of adequate data
we could not study the impact on medium-sized firms. The small firm sector
we could analyse in detail lost about 3 per cent, or 11,000 jobs, in a year.
In view of a strong linkage between low pay and short tenures we made
attempts at analysing how the flows between employment and unemploy-
ment were affected. We found that workers paid at the minimum wage after
the hike (most of them paid below this level beforehand) were more likely
to become unemployed in the 2
nd-4
th quarters of 2001 than tehir observa-
tionally similar counterparts paid marginally above the minimum wage.
This finding related to workers who had a stable job for more than 2 years
prior to the minimum wage hike, excluding the possibility that the results
were driven by the coincidence of low wages and job hopping. Analysing a
panel of UI outflows covering 1998–2002 we found that the job finding
probability of low-wage UI recipients (most of them unskilled) markedly
deteriorated from the 1
st quarter of 2001 onwards compared to the whole
unskilled population recieving UI. The aggregate effect of the changes in
the observed flows would be difficult to summarise in a single indicator.
The findings are qualitative and suggest that low-wage workers found more
difficult to keep their jobs and find new ones after the minimum wage hike.
The government’s declared assumption that a large minimum wage in-
crease has negligible effect on labour demand while it exerts strong posi-
tive influence on search frictions and incentives, and hence employment,
was apparently mistaken. This paper observed the net effect of demand and
supply reactions and as such was unable to seperate the two sides. How-
ever, in case the post-hike evolutions were dominated by monopsony,
search friction, or efficiency wage mechanisms the high-unemployment,
low-wage regions ought to have experienced more favourable employment38
records. Our findings suggested that these regions were equally or even
worse affected than others.
Our analysis can be subject to criticism for its old-fashioned ‘differential
treatment’ approach. In a non-experimental setting it is difficult to disen-
tangle the minimum wage effect from unrelated disturbances, such as shifts
in demand for low-wage versus high-wage workers due to technological
change or structural shocks. We responded to this challenge by chosing a
short and otherwise peaceful period for the study of the aftermaths, and by
controling the estimates for such distrubances when it was possible with the
data at hand.
There is no general agreement in the recent literature as to how a minor in-
crease in the minimum wage affects employment but most analyists agree
that a major hike is likely to eliminate jobs. Where the frontiers between
‘minor’ and ‘major’ are is hard to answer in general – it seems that Hun-
gary’s experiment of 2001 is an example for the latter.39
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Figure 1: The minimum wage-average wage ratio 1989–2002
Source: 1998-2001: Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2002. 2002: Wage Survey
Lines: selected OECD countries 1992–93 (Dolado et al 1996)
Figure 2: Workers paid near the minimum wage 1989–2002
Near: ± 5 % range.
Source: 1989–2001: Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2002. , 2002: Wage Survey




























Figure 3: Employment in 1998-2002
(Seasonally adjusted monthly levels, million, agriculture and the public sector excluded)
Source: LFS, adjusted by the National Bank of Hungary.
Figure 4: Quarterly GDP and seasonally adjusted employment in
1998–2002
The public sector and agriculture excluded. 1997.q4 = 1.
1998         1999           2000       2001        2002
Sources: Employment-National Bank. GDP – CSO, www.ksh.hu/stadat
months 1998-2002
 National Bank estimate  trend 4672*t-28.5*tsq
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Figure 5: Illustration of the estimated aggregate employment effect
(Seasonally adjusted monthly employment levels, million, agriculture and the public
sector excluded)
Figure 6: Change of employment and the minimum wage shock in 60 groups
Before: 2000. 4
th quarter. After: 2001. 4
th quarter. Source: LFS
Log change in the
employment ratio
 
Implied change in log wage







 National Bank estimate  trend 4672*t-28.5*tsq
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Table 1: Fraction low-wage and ωωωω  in May 2000
(A)  Fraction low-wage (Base wage<Ft 38,685, per cent)
Regions 15-24 old 25-34 old 35-44 old 45-54 old 55 & older Total
Primary 38.4
1
st 34.7 30.3 31.9 28.0 33.1
2
nd 45.3 35.5 34.1 36.6 38.6
3
rd 57.9 46.8 44.3 43.3 42.4
4
th 58.5 52.9 54.5 49.9 50.6
Vocational 27.5
1
st 32.7 29.6 21.0 18.2 14.8
2
nd 42.3 29.8 24.0 21.2 17.7
3
rd 51.3 35.4 30.3 23.8 19.0
4
th 52.5 39.4 33.6 22.9 22.5
Sec, high 11.3
1
st 22.9 12.8 9.2 6.7 5.8
2
nd 28.9 16.0 9.9 6.7 5.2
3
rd 35.9 17.7 9.9 7.5 5.4
4
th 38.11 8.7 9.6 6.7 4.3
Total 36.0 24.5 20.11 7.6 16.2 21.7
(B) Estimated ω  (per cent)
Regions 15-24 old 25-34 old 35-44 old 45-54 old 55 & older Total
Primary 6.0
1
st 7.1 5.3 5.0 4.2 5.4
2
nd 10.2 7.2 6.2 5.5 6.2
3
rd 13.2 9.7 7.9 6.9 7.0
4
th 16.7 13.11 0.1 8.8 10.3
Vocational 4.1
1
st 5.5 4.3 3.0 2.3 1.9
2
nd 8.7 4.9 3.6 2.8 2.5
3
rd 12.8 6.4 4.8 3.9 3.2
4
th 12.4 7.4 5.1 3.4 2.8
Sec, high 1.0
1
st 2.4 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.4
2
nd 4.3 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.4
3
rd 6.5 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.5
4
th 5.8 2.1 0.9 0.6 0.3
Total 6.1 2.6 2.11 .0 1.0 2.3
(C) Shares in full-time employment
Age 15-24 old 25-34 old 35-44 old 45-54 old 55 & older Total
10.0 24.0 26.6 31.4 7.9 100.0
Education Primary Vocational Sec,high






46.5 20.8 21.8 10.8 100.0
Data source: Author’s calculation from the Wage Survey, May 2000. Nobs= 179,17751
Table 2: Open non-compliance
The proportion of workers paid below the new minimum wage
Source: Wage Survey Labour Force Survey UI Exit to Jobs Survey
Date: May 2001 April-June 2001 April 2001
Wage concept Gross base wage Earnings* Gross earnings
Reported by: Firm Worker Worker
Full-time (>36 hours a week) 1.92 3.63 1.37
All workers n.a. 5.50 2.57
Nobs 182,263 22,416 8,811
*) Gross earnings<Ft 40,000 if gross wages were reported. Net earnings<Ft 30,800 if net
wages were reported
Table 3: Low-wage* UI recipients finding a job in April 2001
Source of income in the
new job
Head Per cent Per cent earning less than Ft
40,000 in new job
Fixed monthly salary 2,043 64.7 4.8
Hourly wage 1,067 33.8 5.3
Contract fee 47 1.5 2.1
Total 3,157 100.0 5.0
Source: UI Exit to Jobs Survey, April 2001.
*) Low-wage: pre-unemployment gross earnings lower than Ft 40,000 at 2001 March value.
Table 4: Actual wage growth regressed on the estimated average wage
growth implied by the minimum wage increase (ω , 60 groups, robust
regression)
Dependent/Coefficients b_ln(ω ) HIGH Constant F F-test: b=1
2000-2001
















Units of observation: 60 groups combining 3 educational levels, 5 age groups, and 4 quar-
tiles of 151 micro-regions ordered by their unemployment rates in May 2000.
Before/after: May/May.  Data source: Wage Surveys 2000, 2001, 200252
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample of Table 6
Mean St. dev.
Minimum wage shock 0.037 0.052
Producer prices (PPI) 1.062 0.028
Log change of (* if PPI-adjusted) :
•   Output* 0.042 0.326
•   Employment -0.043 0.169
•   Wage cost* 0.083 0.245
•   Total compensation* 0.105 0.242
Share of small firms in employment 0.342 0.289
Unemployment (mean of regional rates) 0.075 0.033
Base period employment 3,466 7,152
Number of industries 432
Table 6: The wage effect of the 2001 minimum wage increase
Estimates of system (2)-(3). Number of observations: 432 industries
Benchmark model
Sure 3sls Sure 3sls
W=Wage cost W=total compensation
































Constant 0.0863 0.1161 0.0469 0.0783


























Constant -0.0407 -0.0512 -0.0341 -0.0600
R2 0.4523 0.4597 0.4530 0.453053










































Units of observation: 4-digit industries. Year-on-year data 2000/ 2001. The monetary ag-
gregates are PPI-adjusted and are in change of logs. The cases are weighted with em-
ployment in the base period. The 3sls equations include 9 sector dummies as additional
exogeneous regressors. All data are drawn from the FR except minimum wage shock
(WS), fraction unionised (WS 1998) and PPI (CSO-STADAT).54
Table 7: Employment regressed on exposure to the minimum wage increase
using grouped data, 2000–2001
Dependent: log change of employment.  Units of observation: 60 (40) groups as in Table 1.
Data source: LFS
Log minimum




LFS, change of employment between 2000 4
th quarter and 2001 4
th quarter
All groups (60)
Unweighted -.7543  (2.51) .9484  (12.20) .0311 .7470
Weighted** -.4543  (2.04) .9839  (12.80) .0006 .7432
Unskilled (40)
Unweighted -1.4754  (2.95) .8607  (8.81) .0845 .7599
Weighted -1.2923  (3.29) .8849  (9.31) .0684 .7559
Table 8 : Employment regressed on exposure to the minimum wage increase
of 2001 using grouped data, 1998–2001
Dependent: log change of employment, Data source: LFS. Units of observation: 60 groups (of
which 40 unskilled) as in Table 1. Weighted with population in the base period. ω  = exposure
of the group to the minimum wage increase in 2001
1998–1999 1999–2000 2000–2001





































Constant -.0053 .0198 -.0013. 0 185 .0055 .0620
R2 .7811 .7352 .9153 .8283 .7616 .7584
POP=1999-2000 and 2000-2001 working age population less old-age pensioners and students.
1998-99: working age population. Due to a change in the registration of student status the defi-
nition used in 1999-2001 was not applicable.55
Table 9: Employment ratios regressed on exposure to the minimum wage shock
Pooled OLS. Sample as in Table 1, Nobs=60x4. Cases weighted with 2000 4
th quarter employment.
Dependent: ln(employment ratio in t / employment ratio in 2000 4
th quarter)
2001. Q1 2001. Q2. 2001. Q3. 2001. Q4.
All groups
Ln(ω ) -.6726  (2.57) -.5347  (2.47) -.6027  (2.47) -.5793  (2.49)
2
nd quarter - .0085  (2.23) .0089  (2.27) .0087  (2.28)
3
rd quarter - - -.0017  (0.28) -.0019  (0.30)
4
th quarter - - - -.0024  (.040)
Constant .0229 .0157 .0202 .0193
R
2 .1154 .0957 .0998 .0950
Nobs 60 120 180 240
Unskilled
Ln(ω )- 1.0890  2.67) -.9744 (3.04) -1.1763 (3.15) -1.1659  (3.34)
2
nd quarter - .0177  (2.93) .0193    (3.02) .0193  (3.10)
3
rd quarter - - .0159 (1.83) .0158  (1.83)
4
th quarter - - - .0040  (0.44)
Constant .05289 .0463 .0578 .05725
R
2 .1485 .1565 .1839 .1848
Nobs 40 80 120 160
Table 10: The probability of sub-minimum wage in May 2000 – Logit
(Full-time employees of firm employing at least 5 workers, budget sector excluded)
Dependent: earned less than 38,685 Ft in May 2000 Odds ratio Z
Male  0.7341      -15.33
Experience 1-4 years     2.0834      18.12
Experience 5-9 years   1.3192      10.27
Experience 25-35 years   0.6194     -21.84
Experience >35 years  0.6221     -17.13
Primary education   2.8669      40.32
Vocational education   1.6279      21.54
Higher education  0.4054     -21.14
Joined the firm in 1999   1.4367      14.71
Firm size: 5-20 employees   12.3800      42.36
Firm size: 21-50 employees   6.5751      30.86
Firm size: 51-300 employees   3.0361      19.06
Firm size: 301-1000 employees   1.6717       8.48
Firm size: 1001-3000 employees   0.8407      -2.59
Foreign ownership  0.7009      -8.64
Private domestic   1.8482      18.40
No majority owner    2.2570      11.24
Value added/worker <1.39 mFt   7.8319      61.73
Value added/worker 1.39-2.19 mFt   3.0962      33.50
Value added/worker 2.19-4.22 mFt   1.6077      13.95
Regional unemployment 2
nd quartile   1.1645       5.68
Regional unemployment 3
rd quartile   1.4400      13.65
Regional unemployment 4
th quartile   1.5927      14.0456
continue
Budapest   1.1829       5.97
Lake Balaton   1.3359       3.99
Agriculture   1.5981       6.64
Forestry   5.3203      13.99
Mining   1.2867       1.19
Food processing    2.2815      11.46
Tobacco    0.1610      -1.33
Textile   4.3558      17.51
Clothing   2.7449      13.41
Leather    2.5164       9.88
Wood   2.2155       8.86
Paper   1.1667       1.03
Printing and publishing   2.3043       8.60
Chemical   1.0828       0.55
Rubber   1.8324       6.70
Nonferrous   1.4232       3.53
Metallurgy  0.9486      -0.35
Metal processing   1.1590       1.85
Office machinery   2.9042       6.66
Electric engines   1.4820       4.45
Telecommunication equipment    1.8337       5.72
Instruments   0.8021      -1.53
Car manufacturing   0.7943      -1.66
Other vehicles    1.3022       1.38
Furniture   2.2223       8.73
Electric energy production and transfer  0.8669      -0.81
Water supply    1.0468       0.31
Construction   2.4155      12.54
Car repair   3.5397      15.88
Wholesale trade   3.0262      15.29
Retail trade    3.5255      18.11
Hotels and restaurants   6.3720      23.39
River and sea transport   2.9350       3.75
Air transport     1.9456       1.17
Transport related services   2.7817       9.77
Railways   1.5941       3.76
Public transport   0.0130      -1.96
Other transport   4.8603      20.09
Mail   1.5194       3.04
Telecommunication   1.3085       1.10
Banking  0.1513     -11.28
Insurance   70.8793      38.52
Real estate   2.0142       7.45
Computing   2.8808       9.55
Research and development  0.3697      -2.22
Business related services   3.0010      15.13
Cultural services   3.3564      11.86
Other services   4.8408      13.9357
continue
Number of observations 119,739
Pseudo R2 0.3487
LR chi2 (71) 45,224.25
Reference categories are female; 10-24 years of experience; secondary education; firm
size over 3000 employees; state ownership; value added/worker over 4.16 mFt; 1
st
quartile of micro-regions by unemployment; engineering industry
Table 11: The composition of the workforce paid near the minimum wage 2001
Percentage share of: Wage Survey Labour Force Survey
Teenagers (under 20) 1.3 1.8
Youths (under 25) 18.6 20.0
Older workers (over 55) 4.5 3.9
Experience<5 years 9.3 4.4
Experience<10 years 27.5 21.6
Experience<20 years 53.5 50.5
Tenure<1 year approx. 20.6* 25.3
Tenure<2 years n.a. 38.1
Tenure<5 years n.a. 60.9
Women 56.0 54.1
0-7 grades 1.0 1.6
Primary school (8 grades) 29.4 29.8
Vocational (without ’maturity’ certificate)    38.6 40.2
Secondary 27.0 25.3
Higher 4.0 3.1
Spouse without children n.a. 37.8
Spouse with children n.a. 24.4
Young adult living with parents (no children) n.a. 19.3
Lonely parent n.a. 6.6
Lonely n.a. 4.3
Young adult living with parents (has children) n.a. 4.1
Other n.a. 3.5
Firm size<5 employees n.a. 15.8-20.2**
Excluding firms with less than 5 employees:
5-20 workers 49.9 n.a.
21-50 workers 15.2 n.a.
51-300 workers 18.0 n.a.
>300 workers 7.9 n.a.
Budget institutions 8.9 n.a.
Authors’ calculation from the Wage Survey (May 2001) and the Labour Force Survey
(2001. 2
nd quarter Supplement). The WS data cover full-time employees of firms em-
ploying more than 5 workers. The LFS data cover all employees paid a wage in 2001
2
nd quarter.
*) The WS records if the worker entered the firm in the preceding year (tenure: 5-17
months).
**) The LFS data on firm size are not strictly comparable to the WS data. The <5 cate-
gory comprises small budget institutions (like the local governments or schools of
small villages) in the LFS.58




































*) The table shows the marginal effects
Table 13: Descriptive statistics of the small firm panel 2000–2001
Year on year data. Source: FR 2000, 2001
Variable Mean Median Standard
deviation
Employment 2000 12.7 13 4.44
Employment 20011 3.6 12 14.30
Value added 2000 (mFt) 60.1 24 618.1
Value added 2001 (mFt) 53.3 19 780.3
PPI 2000-20011 .066 1.063 0.025
Average wage 2000 (mFt) 0.824 0.583 0.901
Average wage 2001 (mFt) 0.978 0.700 0.992
Net value of fixed assets 2000 58.5 16.0 374.57
Net value of fixed assets 2001 69.5 18.0 525.92
Profit 2000 (mFt) 3.27 1 38.3
Assets/worker (mFt) 2000 4.816 1.333 29.1
Fraction low-wage 2000 0.434 0.355 0.392
Minimum wage shock (ω ) 0.119 0.043 0.144
Table 14: Small firm panel – Performance in 2000–2001
Year on year data. Source: FR 2000, 2001






















0 00 . 125 .062 .045 .046 .132 468
0-10 % .274 .032 .158 .091 -.007 -.034 .047 632
10-25 % .741 .166 .279 .177 -.054 -.007 .148 319
25-100% .959 .359 .399 .305 -.090 -.032 .119 399
.435 .119 .224 .146 -.020 -.017. 108 1,81859
Table 15: Small firm panel - 3SLS estimation of equations (4)-(5)
Coefficient Z
Employment equation (log change 2000-2001)
Log change of output .3313 3.34
Log change of real labour cost -.3732 3.77
Fixed assets/worker 2000 .0006 1.60
Lake Balaton -.2240 2.24
Constant .0408 2.23
Real labour cost equation (log change 2000-
2001)
Log minimum wage shock ×  1
st region quartile .5987 10.01
Log minimum wage shock ×  2
nd region quartile .7869 10.07
Log minimum wage shock ×  3
rd region quartile .7604 9.58
Log minimum wage shock ×  4
th region quartile .8999 7.31
Log change in fixed assets 2000-2001 .0248 2.12
Profit 2000 .0002 1.59
Constant .0740 5.80
Observations 1,818
Chi2 employment equation (sign) 33.21 (0.0000)
Chi2 real labour cost equation (sign) 306.66 (0.0000)
RMSE employment equation .4503
RMSE real labour cost equation .2564
The coefficients of 17 region dummies omitted. Labour cost, employment, and
output are endogeneous. 10 industry dummies included as additional exogeneous
regressors.











2000 2001 Change 2000 2001 Change
The share of workers with 0-8 years in school
0 0 0 9.5 9.2 -0.3 10.4 10.0 -0.4
0-10 % .274 .032 15.11 4.3 -0.7 15.8 16.7 0.9
10-25 % .741 .166 16.0 15.7 -0.3 16.9 16.4 -0.5
25-100% .959 .359 15.7 13.5 -2.2 17.3 15.4 -1.9
Total .435 .119 13.9 13.1 -0.8 14.8 14.5 -0.3
The share of  blue collar workers
0 0 0 44.0 45.7 1.2 45.6 49.6 4.0
0-10 % .274 .032 57.2 56.5 -0.7 59.2 59.5 0.3
10-25 % .741 .166 63.5 61.5 -2.0 65.0 64.9 -0.1
25-100% .959 .359 73.4 70.4 -3.0 75.8 73.9 -1.9
Total .435 .119 52.5 57.5 -1.0 60.0 60.3 0.360
Table 17: Small firm panel – Changes in the wage distribution

















0 100.0 96.2 -3.8 3.1 0.7
0-10 % 72.6 78.1 5.4 16.9 5.0
10-25 % 7.7 40.9 7.7 49.2 9.9
25-100% 4.8 9.3 4.8 79.11 1 .6
*)  Paid more than Ft 38,685 (unaffected by the MW increase)
**) Paid more than Ft 40,000
Table 18: Large firms - Minimum wage shock and employment change
Data source: FR 1999, 2000, 2001
1999-2000 2000-2001
Output (q) .5499 (3.15) .8535 (2.45)
Fraction low-wage (L) .4817 (1.77) -.2186 (1.06)
Constant -.0944 -.1708
AR2 .3494 .2706
Number of firms 337 322
Note: 50 industry dummies and 18 region dummies omitted.
Table 19: Jobloss – Estimated fraction of workers directly affected by the
minimum wage increase in groups analogous to the treatment and
control groups
 (Based on the WS Individual Panel 2000-2001, Nobs=52,057)
Wage in May 2000





0.9-1.1 of the minimum
wage (treatment)
83.6 16.4 100.0
1.1-1.25 of the minimum
wage (control)
45.6 54.4 100.061
Table 20: Jobloss - Descriptive statistics of the estimation samples
All employees Tenure>24 months
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Exit to unemployment 0.67 0.30
Exit to non-participation 1.01 0.73
Male .5302076 .4990953 .5245165 .4994098
Age 38.49124 10.83934 40.27192 10.36101
Unskilled blue collarl .0838568 .2771777 .0759896 .2649874
Semi-skilled blue collar .1885293 .391141 .1689385 .374706
Skilled blue collar .3455716 .4755625 .3502658 .4770638
Regional unemployment .0947776 .0607545 .0925442 .0597517
Public sector .1572019. 3 6 3 9 9 7 3. 1741024 .379206
Union member .2114826 .4083669 .2502028 .4331394
Tenured job .9218691 .2683821 .9617706 .191754
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 .1878282 .3905817. 1522365 .3592581
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 .0982127 .2976072 .0932583 .2908006
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000 .1765264 .381274 .1919952 .3938781
Wage Ft >100,000 .1592627 .3659272 .1718567 .3772643
2001 4
th quarter .4333248 .495543 .434425 .4956924
Tenure in job (years) 5.873398 3.649435 7.292149 2.872526
Number of spells 28,986 22,31562
Table 21: Exit from employment 2001 2
nd-4
th quarters – All workers
Discrete time duration model, multinomial logit form
Left employment for: Unemployment Non-participation
Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Male -.117595 -0.67 -.3045474 -2.30
Age .1557931 2.55 -.2309851 -6.43
Age squared -.0021441 -2.64 .0030271 6.58
Unskilled blue collar. .6803479 2.26 .3473052 1.61
Semi-skilled blue collar .6760733 2.51 .2858668 1.52
Skilled blue collar .3759948 1.38 -.14125 -0.75
Unemployment (log) .2676495 1.95 .6022078 5.14
Public sector -.8444886 -2.15 -.054331 -0.25
Union member -.7431471 -2.18. 1054853 0.51
Tenured job -.8202438 -3.97 -.8207332 -4.91
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 (TR) .5755323 2.52 .1882866 1.10
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 (CO) .3248732 1.17 .0582941 0.24
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000 -.4710009 -1.25 -.3192486 -1.32
Wage Ft >100,000 .1512703 0.40 -.2651334 -0.94
2001 4
th quarter .5780868 3.38 .5662387 4.23
tenure (months)=1 2.17144 5.54 .9592629 2.64
tenure (months)=2 1.739318 5.83 1.191281 4.27
tenure (months)=3 1.343199 3.90 1.344827 4.16
tenure (months)=4 1.092284 2.98 -.8895244 -1.49
tenure (months)=5 .7046136 1.47 .6797435 1.74
tenure (months)=6 .7299295 1.22 .7083645 1.50
tenure (months)=7 1.457346 2.95 .2920986 0.52
tenure (months)=8 .6158116 1.05 .5323267 1.23
tenure (months)=9 1.106352 2.36 .0749606 0.14
tenure (months)=10 .3999608 0.66 -.4043508 -0.77
tenure (months)=11 1.133729 2.26 .74098 1.88
tenure (months)=12- . 1433495 -0.19 .4246895 1.04
tenure (months)=13 .5709417 0.78 .4262923 0.91
tenure (months)=14 1.068189 1.67 -.4802813 -0.81
tenure (months)=15 .8857183 0.99 -.4650041 -0.65
tenure (months)=16 1.121908 2.27 1.016324 2.14
tenure (months)=17- . 1872222 -0.26 -.7212356 -0.72
tenure (months)=18 1.128604 1.73 .5729359 0.88





F-test b_treatment=b_control (unemployment)                             .92 (.3376)
F-test b_treatment=b_control (non-participation)                          .31 (.5785)
Reference categories are white collars, wage Ft 75,000-100,000, tenure>18 months.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by individuals
Data source: LFS 2001 2




Table 22: Exit from employment 2001 2
nd–4
th quarters – All workers
Discrete time duration model, multinomial logit form, unemployment interacted with the wage
Left employment for: Unemployment Non-participation
Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Male  -.1273354       -0.72  -.3392083       -2.65
Age   .1576268        2.60   -.232152       -6.51
Age squared  -.0021734       -2.69   .0030308        6.64
Unskilled blue collar.   .7610605        2.51   .3958495        1.83
Semi-skilled blue collar   .7513803        2.83   .3661171        1.97
Skilled blue collar   .4415427        1.61  -.0826386       -0.44
Public sector  -.8145393       -2.06  -.0309909       -0.14
Union member   -.746537       -2.19   .0968406        0.47
Tenured job  -.8512091       -4.05  -.8354018       -5.00
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 (trm) * U   3.233252        2.75   6.212629        6.85
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 (ctrl) * U   1.958068        1.13   4.492942        3.23
Wage Ft 50,000-75,000 * U  -.4224916       -0.21   5.086063        4.52
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000 * U  -6.258211       -1.52   2.536871        1.27
Wage > Ft 100,000 * U   .5945696        0.16   4.345021        1.89
2001 4
th quarter   .5746337        3.36   .5636309        4.20
tenure (months)=1   2.231106        5.63   .9637096        2.63
tenure (months)=2   1.779082        5.98   1.215001        4.38
tenure (months)=3   1.375213        3.99   1.336321        4.09
tenure (months)=4   1.135882        3.12   -.847909       -1.43
tenure (months)=5   .7319302        1.53   .6910063        1.76
tenure (months)=6   .7468139        1.25   .6913502        1.48
tenure (months)=7   1.468803        2.98   .2917725        0.52
tenure (months)=8    .648402        1.11   .5431399        1.25
tenure (months)=9   1.136336        2.44   .0816181        0.15
tenure (months)=10   .4481487        0.75  -.3808861       -0.72
tenure (months)=11   1.167347        2.33   .7527259        1.91
tenure (months)=12 - . 1395764       -0.19   .4143309        1.01
tenure (months)=13   .6007123        0.82   .4347663        0.93
tenure (months)=14  1.120376        1.79  -.4780475       -0.80
tenure (months)=15   .9282963        1.06  -.4410902       -0.62
tenure (months)=16  1.168169        2.38   1.043392        2.21
tenure (months)=17 - . 1580555       -0.22  -.6775362       -0.68
tenure (months)=18  1.101846        1.69   .5452686        0.84





F-test b_treatment=b_control (unemployment)                             0.59 (.4426)
F-test b_treatment=b_control (non-participation)                          1.52 (.2157)
Reference categories are white collars, wage Ft 75,000-100,000, tenure>18 months.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by individuals
Data  source: LFS 2001 2




Table 23: Exit from employment 2001 2
nd–4
th quarters – Tenure>24 months
Discrete time duration model, multinomial logit form
Left employment for: Unemployment Non-participation
Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Male -.0948512 -0.31 -.5614574 -3.10
Age .5115863 3.39 -.3338472 -6.75
Age squared -.0063266 -3.38 .0041778 7.01
Unskilled blue collar. -.1559254 -0.32 -.4750061 -1.20
Semi-skilled blue collar .1277137 0.33 .0850755 0.34
Skilled blue collar .2456568 0.64 -.004839 -0.02
Unemployment (log) -.0166451 -0.08 .3708437 2.54
Public sector -.9144718- 1.65 -.0598691 -0.22
Union member -.7294738 -1.82 .1420791 0.63
Tenured job -.3426703 -0.62 -.6559291 -2.08
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 (trm) 1.059692 3.00 .1078196 0.44
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 (ctrl) .1494378 0.31 .0600268 0.19
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000 -.5535763 -1.14 -.4572246 -1.63
Wage Ft >100,000 -.0494438 -0.10- . 3 114691 -0.97
2001 4
th quarter .3108904 1.09 .3152385 1.79
Exp (-tenure in years) 4.424675 2.61 -.265705 -0.09





F-test b_treatment=b_control (unemployment)                             4.13 (.0421)
F-test b_treatment=b_control (non-participation)                          0.02 (.8906)
Reference categories are white collars, wage Ft 75,000-100,000, tenure>18 months.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by individuals
Data source: LFS 2001 2




Table 24: Exit from employment 2001 2
nd–4
th quarters – Tenure>24 months
Discrete time duration model, multinomial logit form, unemployment interacted with the wage
Left employment for: Unemployment Non-participation
Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Male -.0902772 -0.29 -.6338063 -3.64
Age .516615 3.40 -.3358542 -6.89
Age squared -.0064062 -3.39 .0041834 7.14
Unskilled blue collar. -.064672 -0.13 -.3501494 -0.89
Semi-skilled blue collar .1677547 0.43 .1940126 0.80
Skilled blue collar .2699696 0.70 .0871939 0.40
Public sector -.9174815- 1.65 -.0171159 -0.06
Union member -.7397677 -1.86 .1267663 0.56
Tenured job -.3280886 -0.59 -.6645879 -2.10
Wage Ft 36,000-44,000 (trm) * U 3.967194 2.13 3.643163 2.37
Wage Ft 44,000-50,000 (ctrl) * U -1.366391 -0.38 2.348137 1.27
Wage Ft 50,000-75,000 * U -3.870989 -0.93 3.903593 2.68
Wage Ft 75,000-100,000 * U -10.57837 -1.56 -.7622896 -0.29
Wage > Ft 100,000 * U -8.755421 -1.55 3.209584 1.20
2001 4
th quarter .3097276 1.09 .3139032 1.78
Exp (tenure in years) 4.448773 2.59 -.269338 -0.09





F-test b_treatment=b_control (unemployment)                             2.85 (.0914)
F-test b_treatment=b_control (non-participation)                          0.36 (.5477)
Reference categories are white collars, wage Ft 75,000-100,000, tenure>18 months.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by individuals
Data source: LFS 2001 2




Table 25: Exit from unemployment - Benefits related to pre-unemployment
earnings
UI recipients finding a job in April 2001






Lower than the mean 98.7 1.3 100.0
Higher than the mean 12.8 87.2 100.066
Table 26: Exit from unemployment – Monthly exit to job rates
(quarterly means)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Low-skilled (primary or vocational education)
1998 .074 .063 .056 .034
1999 .066 .063 .055 .036
2000 .071 .076 .063 .047
2001 .080 .082 .069 .041
2002 .077
Low-wage (benefit<mean)
1998 .065 .063 .059 .034
1999 .058 .060 .057 .036
2000 .064 .074 .066 .047
2001 .068 .074 .067 .038
2002 .062
Low-skilled = 1
1998 0.897 0.983 1.047 1.059
1999 0.904 0.970 1.0311 .019
2000 0.895 0.976 1.058 1.007
2001 0.857 0.909 0.969 0.930
2002 0.811 ..
*) Benefit<mean. Source: Data provided by the National Labour Centre
Table 27: Exit from unemployment – The estimation of equation (7)





Log unemployment -.0322 1.09 -.03211 .05
1998 Ref. Ref.
1999 -.0248 2.42 -.0259 2.44
2000 -.0086 0.78 -.0103 0.91
2001 -.0915 7.59 -.0915 7.33




Within R2 .0821 .0740
The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the exit to job rate of
low-wage UI recipients to the rate of low-skilled UI recipients. The
parameters of the 11 month dummies omitted67
Table 28: Exit from unemployment –
 F-test for the pairwise equality of year effects
1999 2000 2001 2002
1998 5.95 (0.0147) 0.38 (0.3623) 53.78 (0.0000) 50.50 (0.0000)
1999 2.26 (0.1331) 33.52 (0.0001) 38.84 (0.0000)
2000 27.59 (0.0000) 55.88 (0.0000)
2001 8.85 (0.0029)
DATA APPENDIX
FR – FINANCIAL REPORTS
The FR data contain the tax sheets of enterprises, collected by the Ministry of Fi-
nance. The sample used in this paper is restricted to firms observed in the WS.
The reports include a full account of assets and liabilites and of annual intakes
and costs including the annual average number of employees, wages and taxes,
sales revenues, material and other costs, and depriciation. The firms can be iden-
tified across waves.
LFS – LABOUR FORCE SURVEY
The LFS is a representative quarterly household survey conducted by the Central
Statistical Office since 1992. Data are collected about each member of the sur-
veyed households and an ‘activity qustionaire’ is filled with those aged 15-74.
The survey has a rotating panel structure with each quarter 1/6 of the sample
dropped after spending 6 quarters in the survey, and replaced with a randomly
chosen new cohort. The number of observations varied between 82 and 85 thou-
sand in 1999-2001. The individuals can be identified across waves. The cases are
weighted by the CSO to ensure representativity. All calculations in this paper
used these weights.
LFS SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEY APRIL-JUNE 2001
The LFS does not collect wage data. In this particular wave respondents working
as employees or cooperative members (22,415 out of 30,485 workers employed
by the ILO-OECD definition) were asked to tell their last months’s gross or net
earnings. The gross value of net earnings was calculated by the CSO using PIT
tables. We used the gross figures as reported by the CSO and weighted the cases
followed in a spell panel with their base period weights of April-June 2001.
NLC EJS – NATIONAL LABOUR CENTRE EXIT TO JOBS SURVEY, APRIL 2001
Following a similar survey in April 1994 the NLC interviewed all workers leav-
ing the UI register because of finding a  job between March 22 2001 and April 7
2001. The workers were interviewed when they contacted the offices to collect
the documents necessary to take up employment. They were saked about their68
minimum and maximum expected gross monthly earnings in the first months af-
ter being hired. The file used in this paper contains the data of 105,957 recipients
in the stock on 22 March 2001 and interviews with 9,131 workers finding a job.
Of them, 8,811 workers provided wage data. The wage and benefit concepts used
in the paper are (i) gross monthly earnings in the four calendar quarters spent in
employment prior to the last UI spell adjusted for wage inflation between the
time of entry to UI and March 2001. (ii) The mean of the minimum and maxi-
mum expected earnings (iii) the monthly value of the pre-tax daily UI benefit as-
suming 30.5 days a month.
NLC OFFICE-LEVEL EXIT TO JOBS PANEL 1998–2002
The data base was built in the National Labour Centre in September 2002 using
data from Hungary’s 175 labour offices . It contains aggregate stock and ouflow
to jobs data broken down by the level of education (primary or lower; vocational;
secondary and higher), and the level of the benefit (lower or equal/higher than the
national mean). The stock figures relate to the first day of the month and the
flows relate to the month. Three offices were involved in reorganisation during
the period of observation and were dropped from the sample analysed in this pa-
per. The unemployment rates attached to the offices are ILO-OECD counts di-
vided by the population of working age, as estimated by the CSO, in the territory
of the office. Job finds exclude entry to public works or other programs for the
unemployed. The number of recipients leaving UI for reasons other than job
finding is also available.
WS – WAGE SURVEY
The National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey is an annual survey conducted in
May 1986, 1989, and each May since 1992. It covers a representative sample of
firms and 10% random samples of their workers. In the waves used in this paper
the sampling procedure was the following (i) the firm census provided by the
CSO serves as the sampling frame (ii) it is a legal obligation of each firm em-
ploying more than 20 workers to fill in a firm-level questionaire and provide in-
dividual demographic and wage data on a 10 per cent random sample of the em-
ployees. (iii) it is a legal obligation of each budget institution irrespective of size
to fill in an insitution-level questionaire and provide individual demographic and
wage data on all employees (iii) Firms employing less than 20 workers according
to the census are sampled by the NLC in a sampling procedure stratified by 4-
digit industries. The firms contacted by the NLC are legally obliged to fill in an
firm-level questionaire and provide individual demographic and wage data on all
employees. The cases are weighted to ensure representativity. An individual
weight (w1) stands for the number of workers represented by the respondent
given the sampling quota within his/her firm. The original survey does not con-
tain information on firm-level non-response. Comparing employment in the tar-
get population by 4-digit industry and firm size with the sample a second weight
(w2) was attached to firms by the authors of this paper. The final weights (w1⋅ w2)
restore representativity under the assumption that non-response is uncorrelated
with variables in the calculations. The number of individual observations varied
between 180 and 185 thousand in 1999–2001.